CIA Whistleblower: They Can See All Your Messages! I Was Under Surveillance In Pakistan! (YouTube Video Transcript)

(00:00:00) Your YouTube transcript will appear here (00:00:00) Billions of dollars are spent [music] (00:00:02) spying on Americans, whether it's NSA or (00:00:05) CIA or the FBI. And to make matters (00:00:08) worse, we know that the CIA can take (00:00:10) control remotely of a car's computer (00:00:12) system in order to crash the car, take (00:00:14) it off a bridge, or take control of your (00:00:16) smart TV and turn a speaker into a (00:00:19) microphone, (00:00:19) >> even though the TV is off and broadcast (00:00:22) back to the CIA. [music] (00:00:23) >> Can they do that with devices? (00:00:24) >> Absolutely. And I'll tell you how we (00:00:26) know. There was a CIA software engineer (00:00:28) who was disgruntled and he [music] (00:00:29) downloaded tens of thousands of (00:00:30) documents classified above top secret (00:00:33) and instead of going to the Russians or (00:00:35) the Chinese, he went to Wikileaks and (00:00:37) they became the Vault 7 documents. So (00:00:39) our whole lives are out there (00:00:41) potentially [music] for someone to use (00:00:43) against us and every country has these (00:00:45) capabilities. Listen, I spent 15 years (00:00:47) in the CIA. I love this country, but one (00:00:50) of the most important things in my life (00:00:51) is the issue of [music] ethics, which is (00:00:53) why I blew the whistle on the CIA's (00:00:54) torture program. Because my superiors (00:00:57) kept repeating that torture worked, but (00:00:59) besides being illegal, immoral, (00:01:01) unethical, it just wasn't true. And I (00:01:03) would let them send me to prison again (00:01:05) because it was the right thing to do. I (00:01:07) mean, we know that they were (00:01:08) experimenting on American citizens and (00:01:11) spreading diseases in American cities. (00:01:13) >> This is the stuff of movies. (00:01:14) >> It is. And because you've been in this (00:01:16) world that [music] the average person (00:01:18) really has no idea about, I have to ask (00:01:19) you, who do you think is the real (00:01:21) adversary of the West, what are you most (00:01:23) concerned about in the world at the (00:01:24) moment? And what about everything that's (00:01:26) going on with Trump in Venezuela and (00:01:27) Greenland? And then, do you think (00:01:29) Jeffrey Epstein was a spy? (00:01:30) >> Yes. (00:01:31) >> Who do you think he was working for? (00:01:32) [music] (00:01:32) >> The Israelis. (00:01:33) >> Why? (00:01:39) Listen, my my team gave me a script that (00:01:40) they asked me to read, but I'm just (00:01:42) going to ask you um in the nicest way I (00:01:44) possibly can. Thank you first and (00:01:46) foremost for choosing to subscribe to (00:01:47) this channel. It is um it's been one of (00:01:48) the most incredible crazy years of my (00:01:50) life. I never could have imagined. I had (00:01:52) so many dreams in my life, but this was (00:01:54) not one of them. And the very fact that (00:01:56) these conversations have resonated with (00:01:57) you and you've given me so much feedback (00:01:58) is something I will always be (00:01:59) appreciative of. And I almost carry away (00:02:01) a sort of burden of uh responsibility to (00:02:04) pay you back. And the favor I would like (00:02:06) to ask from you today is to subscribe to (00:02:08) the channel if you um would be so (00:02:09) obliged. It's completely free to do (00:02:11) that. Roughly about 47% of you that (00:02:13) listen to this channel frequently (00:02:15) currently don't subscribe to this (00:02:16) channel. So if you're one of those (00:02:17) people, please come and join us. Hit the (00:02:19) subscribe button. It's the single free (00:02:20) thing you can do to make this channel (00:02:22) better. And every subscriber sort of (00:02:24) pays into this show and allows us to do (00:02:25) things bigger and better and to push (00:02:27) ourselves even more. And I will not let (00:02:29) you down if you hit the subscribe (00:02:30) button. I promise you. And if I do, (00:02:31) please do unsubscribe, but I promise I (00:02:33) won't. Thank you. (00:02:36) >> [music] (00:02:42) >> John Kuryoku, the world knows your name. (00:02:45) Why? [laughter] (00:02:47) [gasps] (00:02:48) Why does the world know your name? (00:02:51) >> I can give you two answers. (00:02:54) One, I'm proud to say that I blew the (00:02:58) whistle on the CIA's torture program in (00:03:01) a nationally televised interview with (00:03:03) ABC News. The second reason is (00:03:08) I blew the whistle a long time ago and (00:03:10) just in the past 18 months, I seem to (00:03:14) have hit some sort of YouTube algorithm (00:03:16) sweet spot and all of a sudden my (00:03:20) message is getting out there. And you (00:03:22) went to prison for blowing the whistle. (00:03:24) >> I did and I would do it again tomorrow. (00:03:26) I really would. You know, I was I was (00:03:29) giving an interview to the BBC the day (00:03:31) after I got out of prison. They were the (00:03:33) first uh outlet to ask for an interview. (00:03:37) And so I gladly gave it to them. And the (00:03:40) interviewer said (00:03:42) kind of perturbedly, (00:03:45) "You're not showing any remorse or (00:03:48) contrition." And I said, "No, I'm not (00:03:51) remorseful. I'm not contrite. I would do (00:03:54) it again. I would let them send me to (00:03:56) prison again because it was the right (00:03:59) thing to do." (00:04:01) >> And you were a spy in the CIA. (00:04:03) >> Yeah. I was quite an accomplished spy in (00:04:06) the CIA. I spent 15 years in the CIA. (00:04:08) The first half of my career was in (00:04:10) analysis and uh and I got bored, (00:04:13) frankly. And so I made an unusual at the (00:04:16) time change to counterterrorism (00:04:18) operations. And then I was the chief of (00:04:20) CIA counterterrorism operations in (00:04:22) Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks. (00:04:24) >> And if I'd never heard about the CIA (00:04:27) before and I had never heard about your (00:04:30) role in the CIA before and I was a (00:04:32) 16-year-old, (00:04:33) >> right? (00:04:34) >> How would you explain to me what you did (00:04:37) there? What your role was and what the (00:04:38) CIA is? (00:04:40) >> Sure. The CIA is an intelligence service (00:04:44) whose job it is at its most basic level (00:04:48) to recruit spies to steal secrets and to (00:04:51) analyze those secrets so that the (00:04:53) policymakers can make the best informed (00:04:56) policy. After 9/11, we were expecting an (00:05:00) attack, to use Osama bin Laden's words, (00:05:03) that would dwarf 911. (00:05:05) And so my job was to infiltrate al-Qaeda (00:05:09) by recruiting members of al-Qaeda (00:05:12) to tell us when and where that next (00:05:16) attack was going to come so that we (00:05:18) could disrupt it. We could (00:05:21) kill or capture the leadership and (00:05:24) destroy the organization. (00:05:26) >> And give me a range of the things that (00:05:29) you did during your time in the CIA just (00:05:31) for a very topline range of the types of (00:05:33) things you worked on. Oh, sure. Um, as (00:05:36) an analyst, it was actually quite (00:05:38) straightforward. Uh, we would write for (00:05:41) the president, the vice president, the (00:05:43) secretaries of state and defense, and (00:05:44) the national security adviser. (00:05:46) >> And who were the presidents during this (00:05:47) that time? (00:05:48) >> Uh, when I started, it was George HW (00:05:50) Bush, the father, and then it was Bill (00:05:53) Clinton, then George W. Bush. There are (00:05:56) several different publications. There's (00:05:58) the president's daily brief, which is (00:05:59) the most important. I covered Iraq the (00:06:02) entire time that I was in analysis from (00:06:05) well before most Americans had ever (00:06:08) heard of Iraq. I was told actually that (00:06:10) it was a training account because (00:06:13) nothing ever happened there. Nothing (00:06:14) ever changed. And then (00:06:18) Iraq invaded Kuwait. The next day I got (00:06:21) to the office early. I was 25 (00:06:26) years old, 26 years old. And uh my boss (00:06:29) said, "Don't take your jacket off. We're (00:06:31) going to the White House." I had never (00:06:33) been to the White House before except as (00:06:35) a tourist. And so we got in a car, went (00:06:38) to the White House. We're ushered into (00:06:39) the Oval Office. It's the president, the (00:06:42) vice president, the national security (00:06:45) adviser, the director of the CIA, my (00:06:48) boss, and me. And then we all sit down. (00:06:52) The president tells us, "Sit down." We (00:06:54) sit down and the president says,"Well, (00:06:57) now what do we do?" And everybody turns (00:06:59) and looks at me and it took me a second (00:07:03) and I said, "Uh, yes." I said, "Mr. (00:07:05) President, as you know, Iraqi troops (00:07:07) crossed the border at 2:00 this morning. (00:07:09) They the royal family has uh has run (00:07:12) away to uh Saudi Arabia. They've named a (00:07:15) new occupation governor, etc., etc. Do (00:07:19) we know who that is?" I said, "Yes, (00:07:20) sir." I gave him the name and I said, (00:07:22) "Actually, he uh he's the co-founder of (00:07:24) the Popular Front for the Liberation of (00:07:26) Palestine." The vice president shouts, (00:07:29) "Jesus Christ." And then the president (00:07:31) says, "Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you. (00:07:33) We'll take it from here." And I remember (00:07:35) saying to myself, "My friends would (00:07:39) never believe in a thousand years what I (00:07:41) was doing right now. They wouldn't even (00:07:42) believe me if I told them." That's what (00:07:44) an analyst does. When I switched to (00:07:47) operations again, the the job was very (00:07:50) straightforward. It was to recruit spies (00:07:52) to steal secrets. But then if you're (00:07:54) involved in counterterrorism operations, (00:07:56) there are a lot of extras that you have (00:07:58) to be trained in. So you go through the (00:08:00) normal spy training. This is how you (00:08:03) ingratiate yourself. It's something (00:08:05) called the asset acquisition cycle. (00:08:07) Spot, assess, develop, recruit. I meet (00:08:10) you at a cocktail party. You seem like a (00:08:13) nice guy. I introduce myself. (00:08:16) I ask, "Uh, so what do you do for a (00:08:18) living?" Well, if you tell me you manage (00:08:20) a shoe store, I'm going to say, "Well, (00:08:21) it was very nice meeting you." And I'm (00:08:23) going to go on to the next guy. But if (00:08:25) you tell me you work at the port, you (00:08:28) work in the Ministry of Defense, you (00:08:31) work in the Chinese embassy, (00:08:34) I'm going to invite you to lunch. I've (00:08:36) spotted you. I've assessed you. And my (00:08:38) assessment is I'd like to get to know (00:08:40) you. Then I begin to develop you. I'll (00:08:43) give you an example. I was in Pakistan. (00:08:46) I got a tip that uh that al-Qaeda, a (00:08:49) group of mid-level al-Qaeda fighters was (00:08:52) meeting every single day in a coffee (00:08:55) shop at 10:00 in the morning. My Arabic (00:08:58) was absolutely flawless at the time. And (00:09:01) so I had a bushy beard that I grew for (00:09:04) operational reasons. (00:09:05) >> Can I hear some of your Arabic? (00:09:06) >> Yeah. Uh, (00:09:09) it's nice to meet you. Or (00:09:13) Alhamdulillah. (00:09:16) Uh, so I uh I bought an Arabic newspaper (00:09:20) and I went to the coffee shop and I just (00:09:22) sat there and sure enough at 10:00 the (00:09:26) four of them came in. One of them looked (00:09:28) at me and I looked at him and that was (00:09:31) it. We made eye contact. I did that for (00:09:33) a week. (00:09:34) The second week I was there drinking my (00:09:37) coffee, sitting with my Arabic (00:09:39) newspaper, and the one who had looked at (00:09:41) me the week before, he nodded. So I (00:09:44) nodded back. That was it. No (00:09:46) communication otherwise. The third week, (00:09:48) I'm a regular now. He recognizes me. (00:09:52) So he says to me, I said, "May peace be (00:09:56) upon you." And I say, "And upon you (00:09:58) peace." One day he came in alone and I (00:10:02) said, "Please have a seat. Sit with me. (00:10:05) No sense in you sitting alone and me (00:10:07) sitting alone." So he sat down. We (00:10:09) started talking. And um I asked him how (00:10:13) long he had been in Pakistan. He said, (00:10:15) "Oh, I've been here for 5 years. I was (00:10:17) in Afghanistan. I was making jihad (00:10:20) against the Americans." And I said, "Oh, (00:10:22) that must have been hell on earth." He (00:10:24) said, "Oh." He said that the bombing of (00:10:26) Tora Bora was hideous. That was the word (00:10:28) that he used. It was hideous. And I (00:10:31) said, "And what about your family? How's (00:10:33) your family?" He said, "My wife and and (00:10:35) son and daughter are in Cairo. I've (00:10:39) never met my son." He was born just (00:10:41) after I left to make jihad. I said, "I'm (00:10:43) so sorry." And he said, "Yes, I'm I'm (00:10:46) lonely and I I want to go home." And we (00:10:49) continued this relationship. (00:10:51) And finally, I said to him, "Let me take (00:10:55) you to dinner. let's get out of the (00:10:57) coffee shop. The truth was I didn't want (00:10:59) one of his friends to walk in and see (00:11:00) us. So, we went to a restaurant for (00:11:02) dinner and I said, "Listen, (00:11:06) there's something that I haven't been (00:11:08) truthful with you about. (00:11:11) I'm not Lebanese." (00:11:14) And I said, "Actually, I'm American. (00:11:17) Are you okay with that?" (00:11:20) And he says, "I think so." I said, (00:11:22) 'Well, actually, (00:11:25) I'm a CIA officer. (00:11:28) And he says, ' Okay.' So, he didn't run (00:11:31) screaming from the room or pull a gun or (00:11:35) anything. And he said, (00:11:38) "Why do you want me? Why do you want to (00:11:40) talk to me?" I said, "Actually, you have (00:11:43) access to something that I want." It was (00:11:45) very specific. And I told him what it (00:11:47) was. And he says, "And what will you do (00:11:50) for me?" And I said, "Anything your (00:11:53) heart desires." (00:11:55) And he said, "I want to go home." (00:11:58) I said, "I can do that." And (00:11:59) >> you wanted information presumably. (00:12:01) >> I wanted information, very specific (00:12:03) information, (00:12:04) >> which you can't share. (00:12:05) >> No. I'll go right back to prison. So, (00:12:08) uh, [laughter] (00:12:09) so um, we got him a passport. I bought (00:12:14) him a first class ticket and I took him (00:12:18) to the airport, gave him some cash to (00:12:19) get himself started again. And I said, (00:12:22) "Before you go, I have to ask you, why (00:12:25) did you agree to give me this (00:12:27) information? I mean, presumably I'm the (00:12:30) enemy." And he said, "I've been here 5 (00:12:33) years, and you're the first person who (00:12:35) ever asked me about my family." (00:12:38) So I said, "Best of luck. Never saw him (00:12:41) again. (00:12:43) That's the job. (00:12:44) >> I have to ask you, (00:12:48) >> take me on the journey of you being a (00:12:51) young man (00:12:52) >> in West Pennsylvania, (00:12:54) >> right? (00:12:56) >> To becoming a spy. What happened? (00:12:58) Because I'll be I'll be honest. You (00:13:00) know, I don't really know what my (00:13:01) perception of spies is, but it's not (00:13:03) you. (00:13:05) >> That's good. (00:13:06) >> That's good. See, because I kind of work (00:13:08) under the radar. M so that's really (00:13:11) interesting is I [laughter] there's (00:13:13) there's so many um once you learn about (00:13:16) spies as a podcast like so if you go (00:13:18) back a couple of years and someone had (00:13:20) told me about spies I wouldn't have (00:13:21) believed them I wouldn't have believed (00:13:22) that these things actually happened (00:13:24) >> you know you hear about people going (00:13:26) undercover (00:13:27) >> and going to other countries and getting (00:13:29) secrets and and all of these things (00:13:33) >> and it's not until you meet the people (00:13:35) that said (00:13:37) yes that's me I used to do that that (00:13:39) you're sort you have this paradigm shift (00:13:40) in your mind and you go, "Oh my god, (00:13:41) what else might be going on?" (00:13:42) >> Right? (00:13:43) >> Because I lived in this world probably (00:13:44) up until the age of, I don't know, 30 (00:13:46) years old where I kind of just assume (00:13:48) things are what they are (00:13:49) >> like as I see them. And then, you know, (00:13:52) you start to discover that there's (00:13:53) layers of secrecy. Nations are against (00:13:55) each other. They're doing all of these (00:13:57) covert operations. And even like as a (00:13:59) podcaster now, I have moments where I go (00:14:03) like, "How do I know that you're not (00:14:06) you're not here to steal secrets from (00:14:07) me?" (00:14:08) >> Right? So, you know what's funny? When I (00:14:09) had Andre Bustamante on the show, the (00:14:12) comment sections are always the same. (00:14:14) They're always like, "Once a CIA spy, (00:14:15) always a CIA spy." (00:14:16) >> I hate when people say that. It's so (00:14:18) intellectually lazy. (00:14:20) >> But I just I do wonder and I go, "Okay, (00:14:22) here's a super conspiracy theory. What (00:14:24) if the CIA have made spies do really (00:14:28) well in the YouTube algorithm so that (00:14:31) all of us as long form podcasters invite (00:14:33) them on and then they (00:14:35) >> You know what? I would agree with that. (00:14:36) I would have agreed with that a year ago (00:14:38) because Andrew Bamante has really made a (00:14:41) handsome living out of selling his (00:14:44) experience and he's on every podcast. (00:14:46) >> Yeah. (00:14:47) >> But I am the most anti-CIA former CIA (00:14:52) person that's out there. (00:14:54) >> But wouldn't that be the perfect CIA (00:14:56) agent? (00:14:58) >> I mean, if if I weren't constantly (00:15:00) criticizing the CIA as a as a an (00:15:02) organization that's just out of control. (00:15:05) Do you think the CIA are have a strategy (00:15:07) for podcasters and for podcasting? (00:15:09) >> I think yes, now they do. It took them a (00:15:12) little while to to get current, but just (00:15:16) like they over time developed a strategy (00:15:19) with Hollywood, (00:15:21) sure they're developing a strategy with (00:15:22) podcasters. You know, it was only in the (00:15:25) last 10 years that the CIA opened a (00:15:28) branch within the Office of Public (00:15:30) Affairs whose job it is solely to liers (00:15:32) with Hollywood studios. The FBI's been (00:15:35) doing this since the since the 40s. And (00:15:38) the goal is that everything that comes (00:15:41) out of Hollywood should be pro-CIA. (00:15:43) And you know, we end up with with Zero (00:15:47) Dark 30 and you know, the recruit and (00:15:50) the CIA, Argo, the CIA is always the (00:15:53) hero in these movies. If you were still (00:15:54) at the CIA now and your job was to in (00:15:57) infiltrate and (00:16:00) uh use creators or podcasters as an (00:16:03) asset for the CIA's objectives, how (00:16:07) might you design that plan? If we were (00:16:09) just hypothesizing, (00:16:11) you would have to have (00:16:14) a goal (00:16:17) that would be specific enough that you (00:16:19) could actually track the progress to it. (00:16:21) So, you can't just say, "Well, I'm going (00:16:22) to pay this podcaster x amount of money, (00:16:25) and we're going to we're going to we're (00:16:28) going to do something with the algorithm (00:16:30) to make him vastly popular among (00:16:34) men, you know, 18 to 30, let's say. (00:16:37) There's got to be more to it than that. (00:16:39) It has to be a message. You've got to be (00:16:42) able to get a specific, well-honed (00:16:45) message out there. And the message can (00:16:48) be anything. (00:16:51) It could be, you know, love the CIA, (00:16:53) we're the good guys. It could be support (00:16:55) the overthrow of the Iranian government. (00:16:58) It could be, you know, any criticism of (00:17:01) Benjamin Netanyahu is anti-semitism. (00:17:04) It could be anything you want it to be. (00:17:06) You just have to make sure that it's (00:17:08) repeated enough. See, this was the (00:17:09) danger with the torture program. This is (00:17:11) one of the very important reasons that I (00:17:13) went public when I did because my (00:17:16) colleagues, my superiors at the CIA kept (00:17:19) repeating this lie over and over and (00:17:22) over again that torture worked and that (00:17:25) torture got us information that saved (00:17:27) American lives. And that was just simply (00:17:29) not true. It was a lie. Besides being (00:17:33) illegal, immoral, unethical, it just (00:17:36) wasn't true. And so I decided before we (00:17:40) go down this road anymore, I'm going to (00:17:42) go public. (00:17:43) >> So can you take me back then? We got a (00:17:45) little bit sidetracked there, but (00:17:47) >> Sure. (00:17:48) >> John, how did you come to be a CIA spy? (00:17:52) >> When I was 9 years old, I told my (00:17:55) parents that I wanted to be a spy when I (00:17:57) grew up. it came time to apply for (00:18:00) college and I only applied at one (00:18:02) university, George Washington University (00:18:05) in Washington because it was two blocks (00:18:08) from the White House and it was one of (00:18:10) only three schools in America that (00:18:11) offered a Middle Eastern studies (00:18:13) program. I was one of only four people (00:18:16) in that brand new Middle Eastern studies (00:18:19) program. I stayed for a master's degree (00:18:22) in legislative affairs with a focus on (00:18:25) foreign policy analysis. I was taking a (00:18:28) class in that program called the (00:18:30) psychology of leadership. It was taught (00:18:32) by an eminent psychiatrist named Dr. (00:18:34) Gerald Post and he gave us an assignment (00:18:39) one uh one day where we had to shadow (00:18:42) our bosses. We had to just follow our (00:18:44) bosses for a week. (00:18:45) >> Your bosses? (00:18:46) >> Yeah. I worked at a labor union called (00:18:48) the United Food and Commercial Workers (00:18:50) Union. And so we were just supposed to (00:18:52) follow our boss around for a week and (00:18:54) then write a psychological profile. I (00:18:58) used dozens of, you know, footnotes from (00:19:01) psychological, you know, psychology (00:19:03) texts. And I ended up saying that he was (00:19:05) a sociopath with psychopathic and (00:19:08) possibly violent tendencies. And, you (00:19:10) know, I had these citations. (00:19:13) I passed the paper in. Dr. Post gives it (00:19:15) back to me a week later, gave me an A, (00:19:17) and then he wrote, "Please see me after (00:19:19) class." So I went up to him after the (00:19:22) class and I said, "Dr. Post, you wanted (00:19:23) to see me." He says, "Come to my (00:19:25) office." So we went down there. He (00:19:27) closed the door and he says, "Listen, (00:19:30) I'm not really a professor here. I'm a (00:19:34) CIA officer undercover as a professor (00:19:37) here, and I'm looking for people who (00:19:39) would fit into the CIA's culture. I (00:19:42) think you would fit into the CIA's (00:19:44) culture. Would you like to be a spy?" (00:19:47) And I said, "Yes, (00:19:50) I would." He picked up the phone and (00:19:54) called the number and he said, "Bob, (00:19:58) this is Jerry. I've got a good one for (00:20:00) you. Do you have some time?" And he (00:20:02) said, "Sure." He writes an address on a (00:20:05) scrap of paper. And he says, "Be at this (00:20:07) address in 20 minutes." It was only one (00:20:09) subway stop away. So I jumped on the (00:20:11) metro. I went to Rosland, Virginia, just (00:20:13) across the river. I had to buzz to be (00:20:16) led in. And a woman opens the door. She (00:20:18) says, "Are you here for Bob?" And I (00:20:20) said, "Yes." She says, "Come on in." (00:20:23) I'm sitting there for a moment and then (00:20:25) this like 6 foot6, 350 lb giant barrels (00:20:30) out of his office and he says, "John (00:20:33) Bob, how the hell are you? I want you to (00:20:35) be at the George Washington University (00:20:37) Medical School Saturday morning at 8:00. (00:20:40) We've got some tests for you." I said, (00:20:42) "Okay." And then we shook hands and I (00:20:45) left. So, Saturday morning, I went to (00:20:48) the GW Medical School auditorium. There (00:20:51) were like, I don't know, 200 people (00:20:53) there and they hand us a test. My wife (00:20:57) picked me up. She said, "How did you (00:20:58) do?" I said, "I have no idea." (00:21:00) >> Does your wife at this point know that (00:21:02) you were applying for the CIA? (00:21:04) >> Yes. And that was going to be pretty (00:21:06) much the extent of what she ended up (00:21:08) knowing cuz once I got in, (00:21:11) >> but you were allowed to tell her. (00:21:12) >> I was not allowed to tell her. No. So, (00:21:15) you told her anyway? (00:21:17) >> Yeah. When I first applied, they said, (00:21:19) "Listen, don't tell anybody because you (00:21:21) may go undercover. You may go under deep (00:21:24) cover, and we can't have people out (00:21:26) there who know that you're a CIA (00:21:29) officer." (00:21:29) >> Presumably, the CIA are smart enough to (00:21:32) be able to check if you've told her. (00:21:33) >> Yeah. And they ask you on the polygraph, (00:21:36) "Did you tell her?" Really? (00:21:37) >> And I said, "Yeah, I told her. She's my (00:21:39) wife. What am I going to do?" You know, (00:21:41) but it got to the point where I'd get (00:21:44) home from a day where, you know, I broke (00:21:45) into some guy's house and and planted a (00:21:47) camera on a bug and I'd get home and (00:21:50) she'd say, "How was your day?" I'd say, (00:21:51) "Great. What'd you do?" Not a darn (00:21:54) thing. And then my phone would ring at, (00:21:56) you know, midnight and a guy would say, (00:21:59) "The rain in Spain falls mainly in the (00:22:01) plane." And I'd say, "Uh, Marzy Oats and (00:22:04) Dozy Oats and Little Lambs Ivy." And (00:22:06) that means meet me at the yacht club (00:22:09) parking lot in three hours. (00:22:12) And then I'd leave. She's she would say, (00:22:13) "Where where are you going? It's (00:22:15) midnight. I got to work." So I'd leave. (00:22:18) I'd do my meeting. I'd come home 6:00 in (00:22:21) the morning just in time to shower and (00:22:23) shave and get dressed to go to work. And (00:22:25) she would say, "What was her name?" (00:22:29) And I I remember this one terrible time. (00:22:32) That's what she said to me. What was her (00:22:33) name? The truth is, I had been sitting (00:22:36) in a garbage dumpster waiting for a guy (00:22:39) to drive by down the alley and throw a (00:22:41) bag of documents in. And I stunk of (00:22:44) garbage and I said to her, "Do I (00:22:46) seriously smell to you like I've been (00:22:49) with a woman?" (00:22:51) Seriously. (00:22:53) So, we ended up getting a divorce. (00:22:56) [laughter] (00:22:59) [gasps] (00:22:59) >> So, you do the assessment presumably. (00:23:01) you get in and then you do training. (00:23:04) >> He He called me like two weeks later, (00:23:06) Bob did, and he said, "You blew the (00:23:09) doors off those tests." I said, "Oh, (00:23:11) great. Okay." So, a month later, they (00:23:14) summoned me to headquarters, (00:23:16) and uh I was interviewed by the Office (00:23:19) of Neareastern Operations, the Office of (00:23:22) Near Eastern Analysis, and the Office of (00:23:25) Leadership Analysis. I was offered the (00:23:28) analysis job on the Iraq desk. And what (00:23:31) is the sum total of the training you (00:23:33) were given in the variety of different (00:23:35) roles that you had? Like how do they (00:23:37) train? (00:23:38) >> Good question. That's a good question (00:23:40) and the answer is vastly different (00:23:42) depending on where you start your (00:23:45) career. (00:23:45) >> So because I started mine in analysis, (00:23:48) the immediate training was in mastering (00:23:51) the CIA's writing style. So the most (00:23:55) important product that the CIA writes (00:23:58) every day is the PDB, the president's (00:24:00) daily brief, (00:24:01) >> and it tells the president what (00:24:03) >> what you think he needs to know. (00:24:06) >> Okay? (00:24:06) >> So for example, when the Iraqis began (00:24:09) moving to the to the Kuwaiti border, (00:24:13) we had this big debate. Are they going (00:24:15) to are they going to cross the border? (00:24:17) Yes or no? So I said, "Listen, why don't (00:24:20) I call the American defense attaches in (00:24:24) Baghdad and I'll just ask him to drive (00:24:25) down there and look and tell us what he (00:24:27) sees?" He drives down there, drives (00:24:30) back, he calls me, and he says, (00:24:32) "Literally, the entire Iraqi military is (00:24:36) on its way to the Kuwaiti border." So we (00:24:39) wrote a thing for the president saying (00:24:41) Iraq is going to invade Kuwait and it's (00:24:43) probably going to happen in the next 48 (00:24:44) hours. And when when did the president (00:24:46) see that particular briefing? (00:24:48) >> At 7:00 a.m. the next morning. (00:24:50) >> Okay. And is there ever situations where (00:24:51) the president would get it? In the (00:24:52) middle of the night. (00:24:53) >> Yes. (00:24:54) >> Yeah. (00:24:55) >> And be told in the middle of the night (00:24:56) that (00:24:56) >> Yes. There there are these levels of (00:24:59) immediacy. (00:25:01) There's routine which is like who cares? (00:25:04) And then there is um priority which (00:25:07) means ah I'll get to it sometime today. (00:25:10) Then there's immediate which means you (00:25:12) should probably read it first. (00:25:15) But then there's flash, (00:25:18) which means, "Oh my god, something (00:25:20) terrible just happened. You should (00:25:22) probably wake the president." And then (00:25:24) there's critic, which means they're (00:25:27) coming over the embassy walls. We're at (00:25:29) war. Wake up the president. Scramble the (00:25:32) jets. (00:25:33) >> 911. (00:25:33) >> 911. (00:25:34) >> That's a critic. (00:25:37) [snorts] (00:25:37) [clears throat] (00:25:38) >> So going back to this question of your (00:25:40) training. (00:25:41) >> Yeah. What is it that the (00:25:44) CIA teach you about human nature and how (00:25:48) to use human nature to your advantage (00:25:50) that could be transferable to other (00:25:53) disciplines in life like business or (00:25:56) well this is going to sound not very (00:25:59) nice but it's it's real life it's (00:26:02) everyday life especially in in business (00:26:06) the CIA actively seeks to hire people (00:26:09) who have what they call sociopathic (00:26:12) tendencies. (00:26:14) Not sociopaths. Sociopaths have no (00:26:17) conscience. They'll just blow right (00:26:20) through a polygraph exam, but they're (00:26:22) impossible to corral. They're impossible (00:26:26) to to, you know, keep (00:26:29) under rain. Uh, and it's because they're (00:26:33) not able, their brains won't allow them (00:26:36) to feel regret or remorse. Now, in (00:26:39) business, most CEOs are sociopaths. (00:26:42) Most, not all, but most. Especially in (00:26:45) big companies, because they claw their (00:26:47) way to the top, usually on the backs of (00:26:49) the people around them. They don't feel (00:26:51) bad screwing the next guy to get that (00:26:54) next promotion. (00:26:55) The CIA wants people like that because (00:26:59) those are the people who are going to (00:27:01) break into a foreign embassy. A normal (00:27:03) person would not advocate breaking into (00:27:06) a foreign embassy. It's sovereign (00:27:08) territory of a foreign country. I would (00:27:11) I'd be glad to do it. (00:27:13) >> Why? (00:27:14) >> Because we're the good guys. (00:27:16) >> So, do you have sociopathic tendencies? (00:27:18) >> Absolutely. (00:27:19) >> And what are your sociopathic (00:27:20) tendencies? (00:27:22) >> My sociopathic tendency was to operate (00:27:26) in legal, moral, and ethical gray areas. (00:27:32) Specifically, that's what it was. I'm (00:27:35) really curious about what we can learn (00:27:36) about human nature from someone whose (00:27:38) job was to meet strangers and to get (00:27:41) them to basically sometimes to turn (00:27:43) against their own country. (00:27:45) >> Like I'm really interested in and I (00:27:47) think I think it's informative because (00:27:48) so many of us, you know, when we think (00:27:50) about what good leadership is or what (00:27:52) good sales man or womanship is, (00:27:56) >> um, it seems like there's transferables. (00:27:59) I guess for some people it's family. I (00:28:01) guess for some people it's something (00:28:02) else. that that that hook that you're (00:28:05) talking about, that thing that gets (00:28:06) them. (00:28:06) >> And the [clears throat] word that they (00:28:07) use at the CIA for the hook is a (00:28:10) vulnerability. And it's not really a (00:28:13) vulnerability in every case. Now, (00:28:17) 95% (00:28:19) studies have been done about this (00:28:20) internally at the CIA. 95% of the people (00:28:24) who agree to become spies for us do it (00:28:27) for the money. Right? It's it's a simple (00:28:30) cash transaction. You give me money, (00:28:33) I'll give you secrets. 95%. (00:28:36) >> So you telling me that you think human (00:28:37) motivation is 95% driven by money? (00:28:40) >> Yes. (00:28:41) >> Really? (00:28:41) >> Yes. The rest was love and family, (00:28:47) um, ideology, (00:28:49) revenge, and excitement. (00:28:53) You're going to get a handful of people (00:28:54) who are hooked on James Bond movies, and (00:28:57) they will do it. I mean, you're going to (00:28:58) pay them anyway, but they will do it (00:29:01) just for the adrenaline rush. (00:29:03) >> It's interesting because when I look at (00:29:04) this list of things and I compare it to (00:29:08) business, (00:29:09) it I would say it's slightly different (00:29:11) from my experience of hiring people, (00:29:13) specifically of hiring people. (00:29:15) >> I tend to think that, you know, you (00:29:18) could one would ask themselves like why (00:29:20) would someone leave a company right now (00:29:22) like, I don't know, Open AI and go work (00:29:25) at a startup. They're going to get paid (00:29:26) way more at OpenAI. You've got these (00:29:28) this equity and these grants, but people (00:29:30) are on mass doing that. And even when I (00:29:32) think about the early days of Google, (00:29:33) people left the big conglomerates that (00:29:35) would pay them more. And they went and (00:29:37) worked for Larry and Sergey um getting (00:29:39) paid way less, right? but to be involved (00:29:41) in something small, scrappy, exciting, (00:29:45) >> and and so I and this is what what I (00:29:47) think about when I sit, you know, (00:29:48) probably I've had thousands of people in (00:29:49) my life now across my businesses, and (00:29:52) money is a factor, but it doesn't tend (00:29:54) to be the biggest factor. Mhm. (00:29:58) >> It tends to be, in my experience, (00:30:01) there's a particular hero's journey in (00:30:04) their mind that they want to be seen (00:30:07) through. They want to complete. (00:30:08) >> Uhhuh. (00:30:09) >> You know, there's a particular way that (00:30:10) they see themselves and they want to (00:30:12) fulfill that. (00:30:13) >> Oh, I could get that. I I work with a (00:30:17) with a very very tiny startup right now (00:30:19) called Ivy Cyber and uh it focuses on (00:30:22) privacy software. You know, things like, (00:30:25) you know, scrambling your data so it (00:30:27) can't be intercepted. that that sort of (00:30:28) thing. And (00:30:31) I've participated in a couple of pitches (00:30:33) to uh to angel investors (00:30:37) and they all say exactly the same thing (00:30:39) that you did. (00:30:40) >> And this is why I was confused when I (00:30:41) heard that money was 95%. (00:30:43) Because I I just think (00:30:47) especially in the work that I don't (00:30:48) know, especially in the work that you (00:30:50) do, I would assume (00:30:51) >> but look at it this way. I think this (00:30:52) would explain the discrepancy. (00:30:55) um you're comparing people who are (00:30:57) making a life (00:30:58) >> versus people who are betraying their (00:31:00) country. (00:31:01) >> True. And what's [snorts] interesting as (00:31:04) well is in those examples that you've (00:31:06) given, money is actually a proxy to be (00:31:10) able to take care of my family. (00:31:13) >> Mhm. (00:31:13) >> And to be able to, you know, fulfill my (00:31:16) ideology and maybe to get excitement and (00:31:19) revenge. Do you know what I'm saying? So (00:31:20) even that guy that wanted the plane (00:31:21) ticket so he could fly home. Yeah. He (00:31:23) could he could have the money could have (00:31:24) got him home if you just given him (00:31:26) >> the reason why he wanted to go home was (00:31:28) because his family (00:31:29) >> his family that was it. (00:31:31) >> What's the extent of the things that the (00:31:33) CIA can get as a incentive for someone (00:31:37) to turn against their nation to give (00:31:39) secrets? (00:31:40) >> Quite literally anything you can (00:31:42) imagine. (00:31:42) >> Even if it's against the law. (00:31:44) >> Well, they're not going to get like (00:31:46) drugs or you know child prostitutes or (00:31:50) no not stuff like that. What if someone (00:31:53) said, "I want you to (00:31:56) um [snorts] (00:31:58) get me a a green card." (00:32:01) >> Oh, yeah, sure. (00:32:02) >> What if they said, (00:32:02) >> "If the information is good enough, not (00:32:04) a problem." (00:32:05) >> What if they said, "I want you to I've (00:32:08) got this tax bill. I want you to make (00:32:10) the tax bill go away." (00:32:11) >> Okay. Give me Give me the plans to that (00:32:13) Russian tank. We'll make it happen. (00:32:15) >> What if it was an American? Would they (00:32:17) speak to the IRS here and just get rid (00:32:18) of it? (00:32:19) >> Oh, if it was an American citizen, you (00:32:21) mean? Yeah. (00:32:22) >> Uh, no. (00:32:24) >> But why? (00:32:26) >> No. (00:32:28) We normally don't recruit American (00:32:30) citizens. By law, the CIA can't operate (00:32:32) domestically. Although they have offices (00:32:34) all over the country. Those offices are (00:32:37) generally to to debrief business (00:32:41) leaders, seauite officers who travel to (00:32:44) denied areas. For example, if if you (00:32:48) take a trip to North Korea, let's say, (00:32:51) I'm going to call you and I'm going to (00:32:52) say, "You don't know me, but I'm from (00:32:55) the CIA and I understand you just went (00:32:57) to North Korea and I was wondering if I (00:32:59) could come over to your office for an (00:33:01) hour and just ask you about your trip." (00:33:03) 99.99% (00:33:05) are going to say yes because they're (00:33:06) patriots. So, I go to your office, I (00:33:08) give you my business card, and we just (00:33:10) chat about, you know, your impressions (00:33:13) of the place and that kind of thing. (00:33:17) >> Just to close off on this point, are (00:33:18) there any skills that the CIA taught you (00:33:21) or trained you in that you think are (00:33:23) transferable for business that we (00:33:24) haven't talked about? (00:33:28) >> They they trained us also in lying and (00:33:32) lie detection. That was actually quite (00:33:34) important. You know, you at the CIA, (00:33:37) you're you're a trained liar. And this (00:33:39) is why the divorce rate is so high. It's (00:33:41) the highest divorce rate of any uh (00:33:43) entity in in the US government. It's (00:33:45) it's upwards of 80%. (00:33:48) >> Trained to lie. How do they train you to (00:33:50) lie? (00:33:51) >> Hi, my name is Dave Phillips. Um I work (00:33:53) for an import export company. (00:33:55) >> But do they teach you the art of lying? (00:33:57) >> Oh yeah. (00:33:58) >> And what is the art? (00:33:59) >> You know, it's it's hard to like it's (00:34:02) hard to pin down. You just sort of have (00:34:04) to have it. You have to have that (00:34:06) ability. But the hard part is you have (00:34:07) to keep the lies straight. I'll give you (00:34:10) another example. I've never told this (00:34:12) story before. (00:34:15) I was asked by headquarters. I was (00:34:18) overseas in the Middle East and I was (00:34:20) asked by headquarters to target one (00:34:22) specific officer of this foreign (00:34:25) country. (00:34:26) >> Target? (00:34:27) >> Yeah. Hi, how are you? Oh, we've never (00:34:30) met. I'm John. So nice to meet you. (00:34:32) >> Let me take you to lunch. (00:34:34) he had access to to information that we (00:34:37) really needed. Uh so they told me to (00:34:41) accidentally bump into him. So I (00:34:43) surveiled him for a week and he was (00:34:46) single and on Saturday morning he went (00:34:49) to a coffee shop. So I go into the (00:34:52) coffee shop and I'm looking at him and (00:34:53) he's looking at me and I said, "I know (00:34:55) you, Ministry of Foreign Affairs." He (00:34:58) said, "Yes. Do I know you?" I said, "I (00:34:59) am John from the American Embassy." "Oh, (00:35:01) nice to nice to see you." I said, 'Hey, (00:35:03) good to see you, too. You live in the (00:35:04) area? Yes, I do. I said, 'Oh, so do I. I (00:35:07) didn't. I lived like across town. Oh, (00:35:09) fancy meeting you here at this coffee (00:35:10) shop. I come here all the time. Do you? (00:35:12) Yeah, he says. I come here all the time. (00:35:14) Why don't you have a seat? He says. So, (00:35:15) I sit down. At the end of the (00:35:18) conversation, I go back to the embassy (00:35:19) and I read a cable and I said, he's gay. (00:35:22) I'm 100% sure he's gay. So, then we (00:35:25) started this conversation, headquarters (00:35:27) and I, how can we use that to our (00:35:29) benefit? (00:35:29) >> Did he have a wife? (00:35:30) >> No. He was single, (00:35:32) >> which was unusual at his age. (00:35:34) >> How did you know he was gay? (00:35:36) >> Oh, I I just It was a vibe. [laughter] (00:35:39) >> Okay. (00:35:40) >> So, (00:35:42) headquarters says, (00:35:45) "We want you to pretend that you're (00:35:46) gay." I said, "Oh, come on, you guys. (00:35:50) No, we really need the information. You (00:35:51) got to pretend that you're gay." I said, (00:35:54) "Okay, I'll do it. I'll do it for Uncle (00:35:57) Sam." (00:35:58) So, I call him and I said, "Hey, I have (00:36:01) two tickets to this show and I was (00:36:04) hoping maybe you'd be free. Maybe we'll (00:36:07) grab some sushi afterwards." (00:36:11) He said, "Yeah, I'd love to." So, we go (00:36:13) to the show. He thoroughly enjoyed it. (00:36:16) And we go for sushi afterwards. (00:36:18) And then we go out again and he says, (00:36:21) "Why don't you come over to my place (00:36:23) some night and I'll I'll make dinner." I (00:36:24) said, "Great." So, I go over to his (00:36:26) place. made a lovely dinner and then I (00:36:28) thought, well, I have to invite him to (00:36:30) my place. So, I told my wife, you're (00:36:31) going to have to like get out. So, she (00:36:34) left. I made dinner. I removed all the (00:36:37) pictures of us together. And we had just (00:36:38) gotten married. So, we had like our (00:36:40) wedding picture up and everything. (00:36:43) At the dinner, (00:36:45) he leaned in to kiss me and I (00:36:48) instinctively backed off and he said, (00:36:50) "Oh my god, I'm sorry. I thought you're (00:36:52) gay." And I said, "Oh, no. I I am gay. (00:36:56) I'm I'm I'm not into hairy guys. (00:37:00) And he's like, "Oh, (00:37:03) okay." I said, "I'm sorry. I think (00:37:05) you're great, but I'm I'm not feeling (00:37:08) it." (00:37:09) >> You didn't kiss him? (00:37:10) >> No. [laughter] (00:37:12) So, we remained friends and in the end, (00:37:16) he gave me the information because we (00:37:18) were friends. And then he he opened up. (00:37:21) He's like, "I can't tell anybody I'm (00:37:22) gay. They suspect I am." and they passed (00:37:25) me over for promotion. And my boss asked (00:37:27) me, "Is there something in your personal (00:37:28) life that you're not telling me? He (00:37:30) knows I'm gay." I said, "Listen, your (00:37:32) culture is backwards. Don't tell them (00:37:34) you're gay. Just say that you've just (00:37:37) never met the right woman." And (00:37:38) inshallah, the right woman is coming, (00:37:41) you know, in your life at some point. (00:37:43) And I actually Googled him a couple of (00:37:45) years ago, and he did become an (00:37:46) ambassador finally. (00:37:48) >> And he's still working in that country (00:37:49) now. (00:37:50) >> Mhm. Does [clears throat] that kind of (00:37:51) stuff happen a lot in the CIA where you (00:37:53) have to take one for the team? (00:37:54) >> Yes. (00:37:56) >> Have you ever taken one for the team? (00:37:57) >> No. You (00:37:58) >> I'm not sure you're telling the truth. (00:38:00) >> Well, I it came close. (00:38:01) >> When did it come close? (00:38:02) >> So, I was overseas. I was a brand new (00:38:05) operations officer (00:38:07) and there was a woman in this foreign (00:38:13) intelligence service who was the ugliest (00:38:16) woman I've ever seen in my life. (00:38:19) like you want to avert your eyes like (00:38:21) she came off the side of Notradam. (00:38:24) She was a, you know, a stone gargoyle (00:38:26) with a giant mole right here with a (00:38:28) giant hair coming out of it. That kind (00:38:30) of ugly. (00:38:32) So, (00:38:35) so I took her to lunch and she was very (00:38:37) nice. And then I thought I did something (00:38:40) kind of gutsy by C CIA standards because (00:38:42) it was early on in our relationship. I (00:38:44) invited her to go to lunch on a (00:38:47) Saturday. Now, as a rule, the people in (00:38:50) this country were not allowed to (00:38:52) socialize with us privately. It had to (00:38:55) be like their whole office, you know, or (00:38:58) several of them together. So, I asked (00:39:00) her just to meet me privately for lunch (00:39:04) on Saturday. Don't tell anybody. (00:39:05) >> So, she was someone from the Middle (00:39:07) East. (00:39:07) >> Yes. And she agreed. And I was like, "Oh (00:39:10) my god, she said yes." And I ran back to (00:39:12) the office. I was like, she said yes to (00:39:14) a lunch on Saturday alone. And my boss (00:39:18) says, "Okay, here's what I want you to (00:39:20) do. I want you to [ __ ] her." And I said, (00:39:23) "What?" I said, "Have you ever seen (00:39:26) her?" And he said, "I know, but we're (00:39:29) the good guys and you're going to have (00:39:31) to take one for the team." And I go, "Oh (00:39:34) my god." I said, I go, (00:39:38) "Okay, I'll do it." And he says, "No, (00:39:41) you're not going to [ __ ] We don't do (00:39:44) that." I said, "I don't know. Oh, I just (00:39:46) started this. I've never been an (00:39:48) operations guy before. How am I supposed (00:39:50) to know? He said, "Come on." He said, (00:39:53) "Just develop her like a normal person. (00:39:55) You don't have to [ __ ] her." I said, "Oh (00:39:56) my god, you almost gave me a heart (00:39:58) attack." (00:39:59) >> But they they might not be mad if you (00:40:01) did. (00:40:02) >> So long as I reported it and I got the (00:40:04) recruitment out of him. (00:40:05) >> It wasn't illegal to act, you know, (00:40:07) sleep with assets. (00:40:09) >> Yeah, you're not supposed to sleep with (00:40:11) assets. It has happened to a couple (00:40:13) people I know and um they end up being (00:40:16) pulled back to the United States. You (00:40:17) have to sit in the penalty box if you do (00:40:19) that. You're not supposed to do that. (00:40:20) But yeah, it happens sometime. (00:40:22) >> So sextortion isn't a real thing. (00:40:24) >> It can be. We don't. (00:40:27) [sighs] When I first got hired, one of (00:40:30) the old-timers told me the story of (00:40:32) about an ayatollah that they were trying (00:40:34) to recruit. And they set this ayatollah (00:40:36) up with a prostitute. And it was he had (00:40:39) sex with this prostitute in a room where (00:40:42) they had cameras everywhere. And so they (00:40:44) bumped him afterwards. They bumped into (00:40:46) him and said, "Hey, we have all these (00:40:48) pictures." And they laid out the (00:40:49) pictures of him, you know, butt naked (00:40:51) with this prostitute. And he said, (00:40:53) "Yeah, (00:40:55) give me that one, an 8 by10. Give me two (00:40:57) 5x7s of that one. How about some wallet (00:41:00) size for this?" He's like, "Get out of (00:41:02) here." and he said, "You know, after (00:41:06) that, we just stop doing that. It (00:41:08) doesn't work. When you recruit somebody, (00:41:11) you really do need the relationship to (00:41:13) be based on mutual trust, (00:41:15) >> not coercion or pressure. (00:41:16) >> Threatening somebody, it's it's not (00:41:18) going to result in a productive (00:41:19) relationship. The Russians do it, the (00:41:22) Israelis do it, but most intelligence (00:41:25) services around the world don't." (00:41:27) because you've been in this world, (00:41:30) what is it that you know about the (00:41:32) nature of the reality that we all live (00:41:34) in that the average person really has no (00:41:38) idea about? (00:41:40) >> Do you know what I mean? (00:41:41) >> Yeah. (00:41:41) >> Because, you know, going back to what I (00:41:42) said earlier, 3 years ago, before I (00:41:44) started doing all this podcast stuff and (00:41:46) started interviewing people that had (00:41:48) been involved in spy work and the CIA (00:41:50) and all this, I was kind of like naive (00:41:52) to the way that the world worked. I (00:41:53) thought I thought if I have a password (00:41:56) on my device, my device is secure. And I (00:41:58) thought that you know, (00:42:00) >> right? All these kind of just simple (00:42:02) things, but what is it that you know (00:42:04) about the nature of reality that most (00:42:05) people don't? (00:42:06) >> Well, I I guess it's a couple of things. (00:42:10) You know, John Kennedy called the CIA (00:42:13) the best and the brightest, (00:42:16) and we're not. We're just average (00:42:18) people, (00:42:20) and we're not as smart as we think we (00:42:22) are. We're not as worldly as we think we (00:42:24) are. We've pretty much missed every (00:42:27) major global development since 1947. (00:42:30) From the, you know, the rise of the (00:42:32) Berlin Wall to the fall of the Berlin (00:42:34) Wall to the fall of the Soviet Union to (00:42:36) the Suez crisis and the Iran hostage (00:42:38) crisis and 9/11 and everything else. We (00:42:40) missed it. (00:42:42) We're really good at day-to-day, you (00:42:44) know, updates for the president. We're (00:42:46) really good at recruiting minor hangers (00:42:49) on around terrorist groups, but the the (00:42:52) big picture items were just not good at (00:42:55) it. Number one. Number two, (00:42:59) until 9/11, it was against the law, like (00:43:02) in stone, to spy on Americans. (00:43:05) And now billions of dollars are spent (00:43:09) spying on Americans. Whether it's NSA or (00:43:12) CIA or FBI or intelligence community (00:43:18) contractors, (00:43:19) nothing is secret. Nothing. And to make (00:43:23) matters worse, (00:43:26) let's say maybe you did do something (00:43:28) that law enforcement might be interested (00:43:30) in. They don't need a warrant anymore. (00:43:33) They don't need to go to a judge and (00:43:34) say, "Well, we have reason to believe, (00:43:36) you know, blah, blah, blah." All they (00:43:37) have to do is just buy your metadata (00:43:39) because it's for sale. Just go to the go (00:43:42) to the carrier. Just buy it. They don't (00:43:44) need a judge's order to do that. It's (00:43:46) all out there. We've made all we've made (00:43:48) ourselves vulnerable. All of our lives (00:43:50) are out there, whether it's on Facebook (00:43:53) or X or Insta or whatever. (00:43:56) If they really want to get you, they're (00:43:59) going to get you. Which reminds me of a (00:44:01) book written by Dr. Harvey Silverglate. (00:44:05) He's a professor of law at Harvard and (00:44:07) it's called Three Felonies a Day. And he (00:44:10) argues in this book that we are so (00:44:12) overcriminalized, (00:44:14) so overregulated in this country that (00:44:16) the average American on the average day (00:44:18) going about his or her normal business (00:44:21) commits three felonies (00:44:23) every day. (00:44:25) You may not mean to, but you do. Every (00:44:27) day. So if they decide they want you, (00:44:31) they don't like your politics, they can (00:44:34) get your metadata, they can go through (00:44:36) that metadata, find crimes that they can (00:44:40) charge you with and ruin your life. And (00:44:43) there's nothing you can do to protect (00:44:44) yourself. (00:44:46) >> To some extent, they did that to you. (00:44:48) >> Yeah, they did. They did that to me (00:44:50) >> because you spoke out about a torture (00:44:52) program (00:44:53) >> that [clears throat] was happening in (00:44:54) the CIA. (00:44:55) >> Yeah. John Brennan wrote a letter to (00:44:57) Eric Holder and said, "Charge him with (00:45:00) espionage (00:45:02) and Holder wrote back." Eric Holder was (00:45:04) the attorney general. Holder wrote back (00:45:06) and said, "My people don't think he (00:45:07) committed espionage." And John Brennan (00:45:10) wrote back to Holder and said, "Charge (00:45:11) him anyway and make him defend himself." (00:45:14) So they arrested me, charged me with (00:45:16) five felonies, including three counts of (00:45:18) espionage. Espionage can be a death (00:45:20) penalty case. Charged me with espionage. (00:45:24) They waited until I went bankrupt 10 (00:45:27) months later with $2 million in legal (00:45:30) fees and then they dropped the espionage (00:45:32) charges and they said, "We can read the (00:45:35) espionage charges or you can take a plea (00:45:38) to this lesser charge." (00:45:41) What are you going to do? (00:45:43) Roll the dice knowing that the (00:45:45) government wins 98.2% of its cases (00:45:47) according to ProPublica (00:45:49) or do you just take the deal and make it (00:45:51) go away? And that's what I did. And you (00:45:53) got roughly two years in jail. (00:45:54) >> Yeah. I uh ended up doing 23 months. (00:45:58) >> Mhm. (00:45:58) >> And for anyone that doesn't know, this (00:46:01) was because at some point in your (00:46:03) career, you spoke out about torture (00:46:05) programs that were happening in (00:46:06) Guantanamo Bay and and elsewhere. (00:46:09) >> Yeah. And at secret prisons that the CIA (00:46:11) had set up around the world, right? (00:46:14) >> And going back up to the top of my (00:46:15) question here, I I'm really trying to (00:46:17) speak to Jane Dave who's listening to (00:46:19) this right now. Sure. They have a normal (00:46:21) life. Yep. (00:46:22) >> They're not really aware that spies (00:46:24) exist and the extent of the work they (00:46:25) do. They kind of assume that everything (00:46:26) they see and people they interact with (00:46:28) are normal and they think their devices (00:46:30) and everything else is secure. What (00:46:32) message do you have for them? A word of (00:46:33) warning or caution about the reality? (00:46:36) >> Yeah, that's a good question. Elliot (00:46:38) Spitzer, the former um governor of New (00:46:42) York, when he was attorney general of (00:46:44) New York, he said, (00:46:48) "Don't nod when you can motion. (00:46:52) Don't speak when you can nod, and don't (00:46:56) ever put anything in a text message." (00:47:01) At the CIA on our very first day, they (00:47:03) told us not to ever say or do anything (00:47:08) that we would be ashamed to see on the (00:47:10) front page of the Washington Post. I (00:47:13) took that seriously. The truth of the (00:47:16) matter is because of technology the way (00:47:18) it is today, our whole lives are out (00:47:21) there potentially for someone to see, (00:47:24) for someone to use against us. (00:47:27) So be careful what you say, be careful (00:47:29) what you write. even ingest because it (00:47:33) can be taken out of context to target (00:47:36) you. (00:47:39) >> And what about digital security? You (00:47:41) talked about the fact that it's possible (00:47:44) for these these forces and not just the (00:47:46) US, but other countries to be able to (00:47:49) hack and crack your devices and see (00:47:50) anything on your devices. I think we all (00:47:52) go around assuming that our devices are (00:47:54) secure. (00:47:54) >> They're not secure at all. At all. It's (00:47:57) not just, you know, NSA, CIA, FBI that (00:48:00) you have to worry about. It's the (00:48:02) British, the French, the Germans, the (00:48:05) Canadians, the Australians, the New (00:48:06) Zealanders, (00:48:08) the Russians, the Chinese, the Israelis, (00:48:10) the Iranians. (00:48:12) I mean, everybody has these (00:48:13) capabilities. Everybody. (00:48:16) So, you've got to be very, very careful. (00:48:18) >> Capabilities to do what? (00:48:20) >> To intercept communications. (00:48:22) >> I've heard you say that they can hack (00:48:25) car systems. They could so they could (00:48:27) theoretically hack into my car. (00:48:29) >> Yes, we know that from uh Wikileaks. (00:48:32) There was something in 2017 called the (00:48:34) Vault 7 revelations. there was a a CIA (00:48:37) software engineer who was disgruntled (00:48:40) and instead of going to the Russians or (00:48:44) the Chinese, (00:48:46) he went to Wikileaks and he downloaded (00:48:48) thousands, tens of thousands of pages of (00:48:52) documents classified above top secret (00:48:56) and they became what Wikileaks called (00:48:59) the Vault 7 documents. So they included (00:49:01) things like the CIA for example will (00:49:05) hack into let's say the Iranian Ministry (00:49:10) of Interior computer system but they'll (00:49:12) leave little electronic clues all (00:49:16) written in cerillic. (00:49:17) >> Cerillic as well. (00:49:18) >> The cerillic is the is the alphabet the (00:49:20) Russian alphabet. Okay. Yep. (00:49:23) uh or they can take control of your (00:49:27) smart TV remotely and they can make the (00:49:30) speaker turn into a a microphone. So (00:49:33) even though the TV is off, (00:49:36) it can still hear everything that's (00:49:38) being said in the room and broadcast (00:49:40) back to the CIA. (00:49:42) >> Can they do that with devices? Do they (00:49:44) >> Oh, they could do that. When I first got (00:49:46) hired, they were able to do that. (00:49:48) >> So they could be doing that right now (00:49:49) with my (00:49:50) >> Oh, totally. My opinion. (00:49:51) >> Absolutely. Yes, that's old technology. (00:49:54) And then the thing about the car, this (00:49:56) was revoly. They can take control again (00:50:00) remotely of a car's computer system in (00:50:04) order to (00:50:07) well, I mean, in order to to kill you, (00:50:09) >> crash the car. (00:50:10) >> Crash the car. Take it off a bridge. (00:50:12) Take it into a tree. Sure. (00:50:16) >> Do you know something I've noticed? Most (00:50:17) commercial teams aren't tested by their (00:50:19) targets. They're tested by the weight of (00:50:21) the admin that comes with every client. (00:50:23) All the follow-ups, all the meetings, (00:50:25) all the notes, the timelines that never (00:50:27) ever stop. These were a constant source (00:50:29) of friction in my commercial team until (00:50:31) I introduced our sponsor, Pipe Drive. If (00:50:34) you're not familiar, Pipe Drive is a (00:50:35) simple but powerful sales CRM that gives (00:50:37) you visibility on any deals through a (00:50:39) sales pipeline. It also automates a lot (00:50:41) of the tedious, repetitive, and (00:50:43) timeconuming tasks that come with the (00:50:45) sales process. I've used it across my (00:50:46) investments for almost a decade now, (00:50:48) even when I was at Social Chain. And (00:50:50) it's so effective in part because it's (00:50:51) customizable. We've been able to tailor (00:50:54) it for different teams depending on how (00:50:55) they work. 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You can turn your (00:51:43) ideas into income and get the support to (00:51:45) grow whatever you're building. And we've (00:51:47) just launched Dare to Dream. It's for (00:51:49) those who are ready to make the shift (00:51:51) from thinking to building, from planning (00:51:53) to actually doing the thing. It's about (00:51:55) seeing that dream in your head and (00:51:56) knowing exactly what it takes to bring (00:51:58) it to life. Enter to win $100,000 for (00:52:00) your dream. All you have to do is share (00:52:02) what it is. Learn more at (00:52:04) daretodream.stan.store. (00:52:08) >> I've heard you talk about sleeper agents (00:52:09) before. (00:52:10) >> Yes. (00:52:10) >> What is the What is a sleeper agent? (00:52:12) Yeah, the Russians are very good with (00:52:15) sleeper agents. We Americans don't have (00:52:19) no no other country that we know of uses (00:52:21) sleeper agents. A sleeper agent is (00:52:23) someone who is taken virtually from (00:52:27) birth and trained to be of another (00:52:31) nationality. For example, let's say (00:52:34) you're born in Russia (00:52:37) and from the age of, you know, two, they (00:52:41) take you from your family with your (00:52:42) family's acquiescence and they take you (00:52:46) to an Americanstyle town that they've (00:52:50) built out in the hinterland in Russia. (00:52:53) And they teach you to speak English with (00:52:56) an American accent. You watch American (00:52:59) TV shows. You watch American movies. You (00:53:01) eat American food. You get an American (00:53:04) style education. (00:53:05) So, I have no idea that you're not (00:53:09) American. You speak English just like I (00:53:11) do. You know, all the same, you know, (00:53:14) social references that I make. You (00:53:16) follow the Philadelphia Eagles, you (00:53:19) know, or or the, you know, San Francisco (00:53:22) 49ers or whatever. (00:53:24) and then they send you to the United (00:53:26) States on a on a fake with a fake ID. (00:53:29) What they'll do is they'll go through I (00:53:32) was born in 1964. So, they'll go through (00:53:35) death records from 1964 and they'll look (00:53:38) for for deaths where the person was only (00:53:41) a day or two old (00:53:43) and they'll take that name and the birth (00:53:46) date and they'll get a social security (00:53:48) card with the birth date and then (00:53:50) they'll use the social security card to (00:53:52) get you a passport, an American (00:53:54) passport. So, you come here on your (00:53:56) American passport, everything's legit. (00:53:59) Now, your name is, you know, Bob Smith, (00:54:01) which was really that baby's name that (00:54:02) died. and you get a job, let's say, as a (00:54:07) travel agent, (00:54:09) and you may work as a travel agent for (00:54:13) 20 years (00:54:15) and never hear from them, (00:54:17) but then they'll activate you and (00:54:19) they'll say, "We want you to go take (00:54:22) care of this target over here. (00:54:23) >> Kill him." (00:54:24) >> Yeah. Or, "We want you to get a job at (00:54:28) the defense department and give us (00:54:30) everything that you that you can steal." (00:54:33) Whatever. There's a woman in my (00:54:35) neighborhood who was outed as a sleeper (00:54:37) about a year ago. She was an elementary (00:54:39) school teacher and they grabbed her and (00:54:41) they ended up trading her back to the (00:54:43) Russians for two Americans. So, they're (00:54:46) they're out there. I I interviewed a a (00:54:49) sleeper, a former sleeper on my own (00:54:51) podcast a couple of weeks ago. He was (00:54:54) from the East German Intelligence (00:54:56) Service and he was raised as an American (00:55:00) and sent to New York. (00:55:04) He got a job, I forget, doing what, like (00:55:06) restaurant supply company or something (00:55:09) like that. And he got married and he had (00:55:14) a daughter. and he told me, "As soon as (00:55:17) I looked at her face the day she was (00:55:19) born, I realized this life wasn't for me (00:55:23) anymore." (00:55:25) So they (00:55:27) sent him an activation. What they do is (00:55:29) they'll send you a radio message and he (00:55:31) didn't respond to it. And [snorts] he (00:55:33) told me he was on the subway one day. (00:55:35) He's just standing there holding the (00:55:36) strap and this guy came up to him and (00:55:40) the guy grabs the strap next to him and (00:55:42) whispers in his ear, "If you don't (00:55:44) report back, I have to kill you." (00:55:48) And so he ran straight to the FBI field (00:55:51) office in New York and he said, "I'm an (00:55:53) East German sleeper and I want to turn (00:55:55) myself in." And he became a prolific (00:55:58) source for the FBI. (00:56:00) >> So he was (00:56:03) taken as a young person. (00:56:04) >> Yes. What was his story? (00:56:06) >> Yeah. Taken as a young person, sent to (00:56:08) Russia to become American. (00:56:11) >> They set him up with this phony (00:56:13) identity. (00:56:14) >> And then after he had gone through all (00:56:16) the training, he came over here young. (00:56:18) He was like 20 or 22. And uh and did (00:56:22) this for 25 years. (00:56:26) And then he said as soon as his daughter (00:56:28) was born, he was like, "Wow, this is (00:56:30) what life is for, not being a sleeper." (00:56:34) Do you think the average person (00:56:35) listening to this conversation right now (00:56:37) is interacting in their life at this (00:56:40) exact moment in time with someone who is (00:56:42) involved in espionage, spying, the CIA (00:56:47) or some international (00:56:50) equivalent? Probably not (00:56:53) because (00:56:55) they're mostly focused. Foreign (00:56:58) intelligence officers are going to be (00:57:00) spread out all over America. If if if a (00:57:03) listener of this podcast is working in a (00:57:07) defense company, a defense contractor (00:57:11) anywhere in America, then my answer is (00:57:13) yes. Yes, you're probably encountering (00:57:17) espionage of some sort or somebody (00:57:20) committing espionage, whether it's (00:57:22) Russian, Chinese, or Israeli. They're (00:57:24) the three biggest ones that go after us. (00:57:27) um in Washington. (00:57:32) I mean, foreign spies there there could (00:57:35) be as many as 10,000 in Washington. I (00:57:38) remember my first wife um she was (00:57:41) teaching ballet at a small private (00:57:43) school and one of the uh the students (00:57:46) there, they were all like four, five, (00:57:47) and six years old. One of the students (00:57:49) there, her father was a Belgian (00:57:50) diplomat. And so we would sit and talk (00:57:54) and oh, aren't the kids talented? And (00:57:56) oh, this is so much fun. They look so (00:57:58) cute in their little tutus. And then I (00:58:00) went to work one day and as I was (00:58:01) walking in, he was walking in and I (00:58:03) said, "Oh, come on, Peter." And he's (00:58:07) like, "You know, I thought you were a (00:58:09) spy." And I said, "I actually didn't (00:58:12) think you were a spy." He was just going (00:58:14) for a liaison meeting. (00:58:17) We had a good chuckle about it. And I (00:58:19) said, "Listen, don't tell anybody." (00:58:21) Right. Right. Right. Right. Sorry. (00:58:26) So, I'm trying to figure out how many (00:58:27) how many spies do you think there are in (00:58:30) the United States? If you think about (00:58:33) >> foreign spies, (00:58:34) >> foreign spies, domestic spies, people (00:58:36) that are basically undercover, (00:58:38) >> including Americans, you mean? (00:58:39) >> Including Americans. (00:58:41) >> The number of CIA employees is (00:58:42) classified. The number of CIA employees (00:58:45) undercover is actually even more highly (00:58:47) classified. I can give you a guesstimate (00:58:51) >> but also you know Russia, China. (00:58:53) >> Yeah. 50 to 60,000 altogether. (00:58:56) >> 50 to 60,000 in the United States. (00:58:58) >> Mhm. (00:58:59) >> So by a couple of degrees of separation (00:59:02) if you know 100 people. (00:59:03) >> Yeah. You're probably going to know one. (00:59:06) >> Sure. (00:59:09) >> You said there's probably about 50,000 (00:59:10) in the United States. So, I've just done (00:59:13) some quick math on my notepad here, (00:59:15) which means that in order to know one, (00:59:19) you'd need to meet 6,600 people. (00:59:23) >> Okay. (00:59:23) >> Because the US population is roughly 330 (00:59:25) million people. (00:59:26) >> That's right. (00:59:26) >> And I and then I did some other maths (00:59:28) and did some research and I asked um the (00:59:30) question I was trying to figure out is (00:59:31) how many people does the average person (00:59:32) meet a year? (00:59:34) >> And it's roughly about 3 to 10,000 (00:59:38) people. So theoretically, (00:59:40) >> so the chances are good (00:59:42) >> every year (00:59:43) statistically, (00:59:46) according to my napkin math, you're (00:59:49) meeting one of these undercover (00:59:51) [laughter] (00:59:51) spies. (00:59:53) One a year. (00:59:55) >> There it is. (00:59:56) >> Now, that number I gave you is I'm (00:59:59) lumping like all CIA people and all (01:00:02) foreign intelligence officers in the (01:00:04) United States. (01:00:06) >> Interesting. But again, if you work for (01:00:10) an American defense company, Northrup, (01:00:12) Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, any of (01:00:16) them, your chances of encountering a (01:00:19) foreign intelligence officer are even (01:00:22) money. (01:00:22) >> Can't you, as a spy with the United (01:00:24) States, ask the United States to give (01:00:27) you loads of money? Like, can't you say, (01:00:28) "You really want me to go do that? Can I (01:00:30) have a million dollars?" (01:00:32) >> Because you're giving you're potentially (01:00:33) giving away a lot of money to other (01:00:34) >> Oh my god. giving away like unlimited (01:00:37) amounts of money (01:00:37) >> cuz your budget when you were a spy. How (01:00:39) much was it (01:00:40) >> after 911? It was unlimited. (01:00:42) >> What does that mean? It means you can (01:00:43) basically give away as much money as you (01:00:45) need to. (01:00:46) >> If I approach somebody and he says I can (01:00:48) give you (01:00:50) this terrorist. I want 10 million. I'm (01:00:53) like done. (01:00:54) >> What was the most you ever gave in? (01:00:56) >> 10 million. (01:00:57) >> You gave someone 10 million for what? (01:01:00) >> Abu Zabeda. (01:01:02) >> Who's Abu Zabeda? We believed that Abu (01:01:05) Zuba was the number three in al-Qaeda. (01:01:07) He wasn't the number three, but he was a (01:01:09) very bad guy. I led the raids that (01:01:12) captured Abu Zuba in Pakistan, Fisalabad (01:01:15) Pakistan in March of 2002. (01:01:17) And um (01:01:20) the State Department had a $10 million (01:01:21) reward. We ended up giving the 10 (01:01:23) million to the Pakistani intelligence (01:01:25) service. It wasn't (01:01:27) >> a person (01:01:27) >> a person. It was just really great (01:01:30) analysis that led us to him. But there (01:01:34) were others in the so-called war on (01:01:36) terror (01:01:40) who (01:01:42) got more than 10 million and got it like (01:01:47) within 24 hours. (01:01:49) >> Individuals. (01:01:50) >> Individuals. (01:01:52) >> How much? (01:01:53) >> One got 25 million. (01:01:55) >> Just a person. (01:01:56) >> Uh-huh. And the thing is, you know, (01:01:58) there's a lot of danger there. If you're (01:02:00) a if you're a, you know, a shepherd or a (01:02:04) tea boy and you make $40 a month and all (01:02:09) of a sudden you have $25 million, (01:02:13) something's up. (01:02:15) >> And what was the 25 million for? (01:02:18) >> It was for a very high ranking (01:02:23) foreign terrorist who was brought to (01:02:26) justice. I I can't I can't say because (01:02:29) it was never (01:02:31) publicly disclosed. But what we would (01:02:34) have to do in a a situation like that is (01:02:38) we would have to tell the the source, (01:02:40) you can't live here anymore. Pick a (01:02:42) country and that's going to be home from (01:02:45) now on. And then we go to that country (01:02:47) and say, hey, can you do us a solid? (01:02:49) We've got this guy who, you know, he (01:02:51) really came through and [clears throat] (01:02:52) he's not going to be a burden on your (01:02:54) economy (01:02:55) >> cuz he's got $25 million. (01:02:57) >> Which country did he pick? (01:02:59) >> Oh, I can't I can't tell you that. (01:03:02) >> He wanted He wanted to stay in the (01:03:04) region. He He wasn't willing to move to (01:03:07) the United States, for example, (01:03:09) >> cuz we're happy to take him. You're (01:03:11) welcome to come to the United States. (01:03:12) He's like, absolutely not. (01:03:13) >> You went to Dubai. (01:03:15) >> I would. (01:03:16) >> Yeah. [laughter] With the tax code. (01:03:20) Interesting. (01:03:22) H (01:03:23) I think I'm I think I'm Yeah, you can (01:03:26) tell my bias from the questions that I (01:03:27) ask about the things that fascinate me (01:03:29) about espionage and spies is just it's (01:03:32) the un their understanding of human (01:03:34) nature and what motivates us and the (01:03:36) psychology of humans that you can learn (01:03:37) from um spies and the nature (01:03:41) [clears throat] of human beings I guess. (01:03:42) >> Right. And also, I guess the other thing (01:03:44) that really fascinates me is just (01:03:47) I've had so many mind mind-blowing (01:03:49) moments where I've learned just how (01:03:51) fragile the reality that I believe is. (01:03:54) Like I thought things were secure and I (01:03:56) thought they were as they are, but (01:03:57) >> right, (01:03:58) >> it just doesn't appear to be that way. (01:03:59) There appears to be lots of secrets. (01:04:01) >> And you know, conspiracy theorists get a (01:04:03) hard time, but actually the more I've (01:04:05) done this as a job, the more I go, hm, (01:04:07) conspiracy theorists are right more than (01:04:09) I expected. See, and that's an important (01:04:12) point. (01:04:14) I [sighs] (01:04:18) I hate conspiracy theories that run a (01:04:20) muck, but you know, the the the a former (01:04:23) CIA director is the one who came up with (01:04:25) the term conspiracy theory. (01:04:27) >> And it was it was a way for the CIA to (01:04:30) discredit people by making them sound (01:04:32) like crazy people when in fact there was (01:04:34) such a thing called MK Ultra. There was (01:04:37) such a thing called, you know, operation (01:04:40) grasshopper or or MK Chickwit or, you (01:04:44) know, the CIA did crazy crazy stuff from (01:04:47) roughly 1952 to 1975. (01:04:51) For example, they um experimented with a (01:04:55) a virus (01:04:57) that they (01:04:59) that they released in San Francisco. (01:05:02) They waited for an unusually foggy, like (01:05:05) heavily foggy day. They released it into (01:05:08) the atmosphere just to see if it would (01:05:10) make people sick. And 11 people went to (01:05:13) the emergency room with this rare upper (01:05:15) respiratory infection. And then they (01:05:17) were like, you know, high fives. Yeah, (01:05:19) it works. And then they they started (01:05:22) experimenting with LSD. LSD was a big (01:05:25) thing at the CIA in the early days. We (01:05:27) were convinced. See, and this this is (01:05:30) this is where counter intelligence is (01:05:32) important. (01:05:35) The Chinese (01:05:38) told us in like 1951 (01:05:42) that the Russians were using LSD to try (01:05:46) to engineer it to be used as a mind (01:05:49) control drug. (01:05:52) That wasn't true. That was (01:05:53) disinformation. The truth was the (01:05:56) Russians had no LSD program. The Chinese (01:06:00) did. (01:06:02) So they tried to throw us off the off (01:06:04) the scent by blaming the Russians. (01:06:08) We panicked and by 1952 we started this (01:06:11) program called MK Ultra which began by (01:06:16) using LSD (01:06:18) um experimentally. (01:06:20) What the CIA did was they they started (01:06:22) by dosing their own employees without (01:06:24) telling them. (01:06:26) Um, several committed suicide. One (01:06:28) jumped out of a hotel window (01:06:30) >> with the hope that (01:06:31) >> yeah, we'll just see what happens. See (01:06:32) what they say. See how it feels, you (01:06:35) know, see if we can control them. See if (01:06:37) we can plant memories that didn't (01:06:39) actually happen. And then they decided, (01:06:42) no, it's not a good idea to dose our own (01:06:44) people. Let's just dose strangers out in (01:06:46) public. So they went to San Francisco. (01:06:49) They (01:06:51) rented a safe house and they hired (01:06:55) prostitutes to go out on the street, (01:06:57) pick up John's, bring them back to the (01:07:00) safe house. (01:07:01) >> John's (01:07:01) >> John's people who hire prostitutes, men (01:07:03) who hire prostitutes, (01:07:06) dose the John's with uh LSD and just see (01:07:10) what happens. (01:07:12) But I mean these are like serious (01:07:16) crimes you're committing against people. (01:07:18) >> Just reading about it here. It says (01:07:20) under Operation Midnight Climax. (01:07:22) >> Interesting name. Operation Midnight (01:07:25) Climax. The CIA paid sex workers to lure (01:07:28) men to safe houses where agents drugged (01:07:31) them and then watched them through (01:07:33) oneway mirrors and recorded their (01:07:35) behavior. (01:07:36) >> Exactly. (01:07:37) >> They tried to erase their personality. (01:07:40) Nice, huh? (01:07:42) >> The goal was often to break and rebuild (01:07:44) the human mind. In 1973, the CIA (01:07:48) director ordered mass destruction of the (01:07:51) MK Ultra files, what we know comes from (01:07:54) accidentally surviving documents, (01:07:56) meaning this is a sanitized version. (01:07:58) >> That day, he testified before the church (01:08:02) committee. The church committee (01:08:04) specifically told him, "Do not destroy (01:08:08) any documents." He went back that (01:08:11) afternoon to the CIA and said, "Destroy (01:08:14) everything." Why? (01:08:16) >> Because it it was damning. They were (01:08:18) experimenting on American citizens. They (01:08:22) were they were experimenting by (01:08:24) spreading diseases in American cities. (01:08:28) And so (01:08:31) he was held in contempt of Congress. He (01:08:34) was fined like $150 (01:08:37) and um about 15% of the documents were (01:08:42) overlooked and survived. (01:08:44) We'll never know exactly what happened (01:08:47) under MK Ultra. (01:08:49) As we sit here now, there's people on (01:08:51) the streets of Iran that are protesting (01:08:55) the leadership there. And the CI the CIA (01:08:59) are often associated with some of the (01:09:02) coups going back to the 1950s. Yes. And (01:09:04) other countries toppling elected leaders (01:09:06) to protect US interests. (01:09:08) >> Yes. (01:09:09) >> Do you think the CIA are involved in (01:09:11) Iran at the moment? (01:09:12) >> Probably. I think the Israelis are (01:09:15) heavily involved in Iran at the moment. (01:09:17) I'll tell you why. for a couple of (01:09:18) reasons, more than a couple. Number one, (01:09:20) in the so-called 12-day war that we saw (01:09:23) last year, the Israelis were absolutely (01:09:26) masterful in the way they went after the (01:09:29) Iranian leadership. What they did was (01:09:33) they (01:09:35) focused on recruiting Afghan refugees. (01:09:39) Iran was home to more than 2 million (01:09:42) Afghan refugees. And as essentially (01:09:47) illegal aliens, they could not avail (01:09:49) themselves of medical care, (01:09:53) the welfare system. They're starving, (01:09:56) right? They only eat if they can beg for (01:09:59) enough to to buy food. And so the (01:10:01) Israelis went to these people very (01:10:02) discreetly and said, "Hey, you know, (01:10:04) we'll give you $200 a month if you tell (01:10:07) us where the generals live. In which (01:10:10) apartments do the generals live? Where (01:10:12) do the nuclear scientists live?" (01:10:14) The Israelis killed the top 12 generals (01:10:19) across the entire Iranian military and (01:10:22) killed almost every Iranian nuclear (01:10:24) scientist because what they were able to (01:10:27) do was to recruit these Afghans to not (01:10:30) just tell them where they were living, (01:10:31) where the generals and the scientists (01:10:32) were living, but what their cell phone (01:10:35) numbers were. And so the Israelis were (01:10:38) able to geollocate the cell phones and (01:10:42) then that's where you fire the missile. (01:10:44) They killed all of them. And then after (01:10:46) the Iranians finally realized (01:10:49) it's the cell phones, they ordered that (01:10:52) no senior military officials and no (01:10:54) scientists could carry cell phones. But (01:10:57) it never dawned on them to tell the (01:11:00) bodyguards not to carry cell phones. And (01:11:02) so the Israelis started rocketing the (01:11:04) bodyguards and just killed everybody (01:11:06) else. (01:11:07) >> Have you ever killed anybody? (01:11:08) >> No, thank God. My children asked me (01:11:10) that. And I told them very proudly that (01:11:13) I have never taken any action that (01:11:15) resulted in the death of another human (01:11:17) being. There's one kind of half (01:11:19) exception. (01:11:20) And I think about this all the time. (01:11:23) In 1993, (01:11:28) I guess it was. (01:11:30) I was sitting in the morning meeting. I (01:11:33) told you earlier that every unit meets (01:11:35) every day at 9:00 and you just talk (01:11:37) about what happened in the country that (01:11:40) you cover overnight. Was in the morning (01:11:43) meeting and the secretary came in and (01:11:45) she said, "John, General Powell is on (01:11:47) the phone for you. Call him Powell." I (01:11:50) said, "General Powell? How does he know (01:11:51) who I am?" and she said, 'I don't know, (01:11:54) but he asked for you by name. (01:11:56) My boss is like,"Well, go answer the (01:11:58) phone." So, I went to my desk and I (01:12:00) said, 'Good morning, General Powell. (01:12:01) This is John Kiryaku. And he says, (01:12:04) "John, if the Iraqis were going to kill (01:12:06) the president, who would actually be in (01:12:09) charge of that operation?" (01:12:12) And I said, "Well, if you're talking (01:12:13) about the attempt to kill President (01:12:15) Bush, George HW Bush, (01:12:18) he had been visiting Kuwait." I said (01:12:21) Kuwait operations are run from the Iraqi (01:12:24) intelligence services Basra station but (01:12:27) Basra station is headed by (01:12:30) um Sabra Abduliz Adori the director of (01:12:33) the Iraqi intelligence service he says (01:12:35) where does he sit I said Baghdad where (01:12:38) exactly in Baghdad I said if you hold on (01:12:41) a second I'll look up the address so I (01:12:43) looked it up I gave him the address he (01:12:45) says thank you and he hangs up the phone (01:12:48) I go back in the (01:12:50) They were like, "What did he want?" I (01:12:51) said, "He wanted to know about Sabradori (01:12:54) and the attempt to kill President Bush." (01:12:57) Like, "Okay." (01:12:59) Eight hours later, we fired 47 cruise (01:13:01) missiles into Iraqi intelligence service (01:13:04) headquarters. But by then, it was the (01:13:06) middle of the night in Baghdad and we (01:13:07) killed the janitor. (01:13:10) So the next day, I said to my boss, "I (01:13:13) killed that janitor." And he said, "I (01:13:16) knew you were gonna say that. You didn't (01:13:17) kill the janitor. You had no idea what (01:13:20) Pal was going to do with him with the (01:13:21) information. (01:13:23) I said, I know, but I still feel guilty (01:13:25) about it. (01:13:27) Other than that, thank God I never had (01:13:30) to do it. I'm not sure how I would sleep (01:13:33) at night. (01:13:34) >> Do the US still assassinate people by (01:13:38) the CIA? (01:13:39) >> Absolutely. Yes. When Barack Obama was (01:13:42) president, John Brennan uh in the first (01:13:45) term was the deputy national security (01:13:46) adviser for counterterrorism and he (01:13:49) started something called the Tuesday (01:13:50) morning kill list meeting. So it would (01:13:54) be Brennan, it would be the National (01:13:56) Security Council attorney, somebody from (01:13:58) the CIA uh general counsel's office and (01:14:03) a representative of the director of the (01:14:04) counterterrorism center. And every (01:14:06) Tuesday morning they would meet at the (01:14:07) White House, come up with a list of (01:14:09) people to kill that week. The teams (01:14:11) would fan out around the world, kill (01:14:13) their targets, and then go back and meet (01:14:16) next Tuesday morning. (01:14:17) >> And are these world leaders or are they (01:14:19) normal? (01:14:19) >> No, these are these are ground level (01:14:21) terrorists. (01:14:23) >> Okay. So, it could be (01:14:26) someone that appears to be a normal (01:14:28) civilian, but is doing something that (01:14:30) they don't like. (01:14:31) >> The law is pretty clear on this. it it's (01:14:35) supposed to be somebody who poses a (01:14:37) clear and present danger to the United (01:14:40) States, to an American citizen, or to an (01:14:43) American installation, (01:14:46) >> which can be quite a vague. (01:14:48) >> See, that's the thing. It sounds like (01:14:50) it's clear. It's actually not at all (01:14:52) clear. And when they get back from these (01:14:56) missions, we just have to take their (01:14:58) word for it. (01:15:00) Which um spy force around the world did (01:15:02) you think was the most (01:15:05) impressive? (01:15:06) >> Oh, the Israelis. (01:15:07) >> Really? (01:15:08) >> Yeah. The Israelis have no rules. (01:15:12) They'll kill anybody. Uh what was it 3 (01:15:15) years ago? This uh this pager operation. (01:15:20) >> Oh, it was so fascinating. (01:15:22) >> Good lord. It was it was a work of (01:15:24) genius. (01:15:24) >> It is genius. It is. (01:15:26) >> It was totally illegal. (01:15:28) >> Totally illegal. But it was genius. The (01:15:30) the moving parts. (01:15:32) >> I I didn't believe it was real. I had to (01:15:34) like re I was like, there's no way that (01:15:36) this is real. This is the stuff of (01:15:38) movies. (01:15:38) >> It is. (01:15:39) >> For anyone that doesn't know, what was (01:15:41) the story? (01:15:42) >> Ah, yeah. Okay. So, the Israelis knew (01:15:47) that Hezbollah, the terrorist group (01:15:49) Hezbollah [clears throat] from Lebanon, (01:15:51) was communicating using pagers. They (01:15:54) didn't want to use cell phones cuz they (01:15:55) didn't want the Israelis to intercept (01:15:56) their phone calls. And they thought, (01:15:58) "Oh, pagers, th those are safe." So the (01:16:01) Israelis (01:16:04) bought a company in like Hungary, I (01:16:07) think it was, that made pagers (01:16:10) and they got Hezbollah to order the (01:16:13) pagers from this company. (01:16:17) They were able to insert explosives in (01:16:19) the pagers. And the pagers went to like (01:16:21) Taiwan and from Taiwan to Thailand and (01:16:25) then from Thailand to I forget where, (01:16:27) Syria, I guess. And then from Syria to (01:16:29) Lebanon. (01:16:31) And so what the Israelis did was they (01:16:35) were able to activate the explosives in (01:16:38) all the pagers simultaneously, (01:16:41) >> killing people. (01:16:42) >> They killed everybody of any import. (01:16:47) They essentially decapitated Hezbollah. (01:16:49) And then the ones they didn't kill in (01:16:51) that operation, (01:16:53) they bombed the apartment buildings (01:16:54) where they lived. See, this is the (01:16:56) thing, too, about the Israelis. If they (01:16:58) want to kill you, they won't (01:17:01) they won't like just do a close-in hit. (01:17:04) They'll blow up the entire city block (01:17:07) where you live. They'll kill a thousand (01:17:10) people just to get you. And they don't (01:17:12) care. And then then they say, "What are (01:17:15) you going to do about it? You going to (01:17:16) go to the International Court of (01:17:17) Justice? Do they do they really do this? (01:17:20) >> Yeah. (01:17:21) >> Uhhuh. (01:17:22) >> Did Did you ever interact with them? (01:17:24) >> Yes. (01:17:25) >> And how did you find [clears throat] (01:17:25) them to be (01:17:26) >> miserable? (01:17:29) My very first briefing that I ever gave (01:17:32) as a junior analyst was to the Israelis. (01:17:34) My boss said, "Okay." He says, "You're (01:17:37) going to give your first classified (01:17:39) liaison briefing." [snorts] So, it's (01:17:41) going to be the Israelis and there are a (01:17:43) couple things you should know. I said, (01:17:45) "Okay." He said, 'We don't allow the (01:17:47) Israelis into the building (01:17:50) ever.' I said, 'Why not?' He said, ' (01:17:52) Because they spy on us.' Not only do (01:17:53) they spy on us, they would always bring (01:17:55) gifts like, "Oh, we brought this (01:17:57) wonderful gift for you and you every (01:18:01) every time somebody tries to bring (01:18:02) something in, you have to x-ray it and (01:18:04) it's got like listening devices and it's (01:18:06) packed with two years worth of (01:18:07) batteries." We're like, "You guys, you (01:18:09) have to stop doing this. Every time you (01:18:11) come here, you try to bug our conference (01:18:13) rooms. You got It's bad form. you have (01:18:15) to stop doing it. And then they're like, (01:18:16) "Oh, okay. Okay. We knew you would find (01:18:20) it. We're just kidding. Come on." So, we (01:18:23) have to meet them miles away from (01:18:26) headquarters in a place that we rent. (01:18:31) So, (01:18:33) he said, "Nothing over the secret level. (01:18:36) No top secret information. Just up to (01:18:39) secret." I'm like, "Okay." So, I go with (01:18:41) like a dozen analysts. And because I'm (01:18:44) the junior most analyst, I've only been (01:18:46) on the job at this point, I'm going to (01:18:47) say six weeks or so, I went last. So, (01:18:51) the first analyst says, "I'm the chief (01:18:53) analyst, and this is my briefing." And (01:18:55) then the next guy says, "I'm the (01:18:56) political analyst, and I'm the (01:18:58) econalist, and I'm the military analyst, (01:19:00) and I'm the oil analyst, and you know, (01:19:02) the tech analyst, and it comes to me." (01:19:05) So I said, because I was overt at the (01:19:09) time, I was not undercover. I said, "My (01:19:11) name is John Kiryaku, and I'm going to (01:19:13) brief you on Saddam Hussein's (01:19:14) psychological state of mind." (01:19:18) Well, there were two Israelis there. One (01:19:20) was from Mossad, and one was from (01:19:22) Shinbet. Shinbet is the FBI of Israel, (01:19:26) and Mossad is the CIA of Israel. So the (01:19:29) Shinbet guy, he has his glasses down (01:19:31) like this, and he he he goes like this. (01:19:33) He says, "Spell your name." (01:19:36) So I spell it K I R. I spell it. And he (01:19:40) goes, "You are (01:19:43) Jewish." I said, "Don't you dare. I am (01:19:48) not recruitable. Don't you dare even try (01:19:50) it." (01:19:52) I was furious. We went out of the (01:19:54) briefing. I was going to explode. (01:19:56) Everybody started laughing at me. (01:19:58) They're like, "They do that to every one (01:20:01) of us. every one of us. (01:20:03) >> They try and recruit you. (01:20:04) >> Yeah. (01:20:05) >> To turn against the United States. (01:20:07) >> Yeah. (01:20:09) On my very first day at the CIA, we got (01:20:11) a briefing from the CIA's director of (01:20:13) security and he said that all of us have (01:20:17) to have in the very front of our minds (01:20:20) the concept of counter inelligence. For (01:20:23) example, he said there's a steakhouse (01:20:25) right down the road on Route 123. It's (01:20:28) the it's the nearest restaurant to the (01:20:30) CIA. He goes, "Don't ever eat there." (01:20:35) Why? Because the KGB thinks we all eat (01:20:38) there. So all the customers are KGB (01:20:42) officers waiting for CIA people to walk (01:20:44) in and start talking about work. Don't (01:20:46) ever eat there. I've never eaten there (01:20:48) to this day (01:20:49) >> because they're potentially all Russian (01:20:51) spies. H. So he said, "Our Israeli (01:20:55) friends have two officers in their (01:20:59) embassy, one from Mossad, one from (01:21:01) Shinbet. The FBI has identified (01:21:06) 187 undeclared Israeli intelligence (01:21:09) officers spread all across the United (01:21:12) States, mostly at defense contractors (01:21:15) trying to steal our secrets." Now, we (01:21:18) give the Israelis 95% (01:21:22) of our defense secrets. You want the (01:21:24) F-35? Done. Here's the F-35. You want (01:21:26) this advanced missile? Here you go. It's (01:21:29) on us. So, they steal the remaining 5%. (01:21:34) >> Do you think Jeffrey Epstein was a spy? (01:21:39) >> I believe very strongly he was a spy. (01:21:41) Yes. (01:21:41) >> And who do you think he was working for? (01:21:42) >> The Israelis. I'm confident it was the (01:21:46) Israelis. Why (01:21:48) Jeffrey Epstein (01:21:51) is kind of the stereotypical example (01:21:55) that they give you in training for (01:21:57) what's called an access agent. This is a (01:22:00) different kind of recruit. So, for (01:22:03) example, if you're a foreign (01:22:05) intelligence service and you want (01:22:07) information like close-in information (01:22:09) from a former president, (01:22:13) from the CEO of the biggest company in (01:22:15) the world, from a member of the British (01:22:18) royal family, you're not going to (01:22:19) recruit these guys. You're not going to (01:22:20) recruit Bill Clinton or Bill Gates or (01:22:23) Prince Andrew. So, you do the next best (01:22:26) thing. You recruit somebody who has (01:22:29) regular access to them. And that person (01:22:31) that you recruit is going to need to (01:22:33) make these people feel comfortable and (01:22:36) appreciated. (01:22:38) And so you give him plenty of money. So (01:22:40) he has this house on an island or he has (01:22:43) the whole island. And maybe you bring in (01:22:46) young girls, you get them in (01:22:48) compromising positions just in case you (01:22:52) need to use what's called compromat (01:22:55) compromising (01:22:57) pictures. (01:22:58) We know we know now that Jeffrey (01:23:00) Epstein's house on the island (01:23:05) had video cameras, (01:23:07) hidden video cameras in literally every (01:23:10) room, including the bathrooms. (01:23:13) Why (01:23:16) Why would he care what was going on (01:23:19) unless it was to use that information (01:23:21) against people? As I said, only the (01:23:25) Israelis and the Russians use (01:23:30) extortion as a motivator. (01:23:33) >> So, would they have made Jeffrey Epstein (01:23:35) rich? (01:23:36) >> Yeah. (01:23:37) >> In order to give him that access? (01:23:39) >> How could they have done that? (01:23:40) >> Oh, that's easy. I mean, you you do (01:23:43) [snorts] I mean, governments are the (01:23:45) only ones really that can money that can (01:23:47) launder money unfettered. And you can (01:23:50) also do it through real estate, through (01:23:51) fine art, and through horses. Those are (01:23:54) the three easiest ways to launder money (01:23:57) today. (01:23:59) Fine art, real estate, and raceh horses. (01:24:03) >> But presumably, (01:24:04) he would have spoken out at some point, (01:24:06) no, he would have said something or (01:24:08) >> no, but it would explain why he got a (01:24:11) sweetheart deal in 2006. I mean, this is (01:24:13) a guy that's been convicted of child sex (01:24:16) crimes (01:24:18) and he gets 6 months of house arrest (01:24:20) with an ankle bracelet. We have (01:24:22) mandatory minimums in this country. (01:24:24) That's a 5-year mandatory minimum of (01:24:25) first offense. (01:24:26) >> He definitely had some interesting (01:24:28) power, didn't he? (01:24:30) >> Mhm. And (01:24:32) Alex Aosta, who was the prosecuting (01:24:35) attorney at the time and then later (01:24:36) became Secretary of Labor under Trump, (01:24:39) Trump won. Alex Aosta said that he was (01:24:44) ordered by the attorney general to give (01:24:47) Epstein the sweetheart deal. Well, who's (01:24:49) the only person that can order the (01:24:51) attorney general to do something? It's (01:24:53) the president. (01:24:56) So, (01:24:57) was it because (01:24:59) >> Epstein was was working on Clinton? Most (01:25:03) of the people down there were Democrats. (01:25:05) I mean, what what was the reason? Maybe (01:25:09) he was working for the US government. (01:25:11) >> It's possible that he could have been (01:25:13) doubled against the Israelis or others. (01:25:16) Sure. Sure, that's possible. (01:25:18) >> If you had to bet (01:25:20) >> Mhm. (01:25:20) >> what would you say if you had to bet (01:25:22) everything you have (01:25:25) on either him being a spy or not a spy? (01:25:28) >> Yeah. (01:25:28) >> What would you bet on? (01:25:29) >> He was a spy. I feel very confident in (01:25:32) that assessment. (01:25:34) I debated Alan Dersowitz about this on (01:25:36) the Pierce Morgan show one time. It was (01:25:39) it was Scott Horton and me who said that (01:25:43) he was an Israeli spy and it was Alan (01:25:45) Dersowitz and General Danny Ayalon, the (01:25:49) former head of Mossad. (01:25:52) Ayalon was kind of into it in terms of (01:25:55) having a fun time. He was just having a (01:25:57) fun time with the conversation. He (01:25:59) wasn't going to admit to anything. (01:26:01) Durowitz was Epstein's attorney. (01:26:04) So, I said that that I believed Epstein (01:26:07) was an Israeli spy. And Duritz (01:26:10) interrupts me like attorneys do. And he (01:26:13) says, "That is outrageous. If he had (01:26:16) been a spy, he would have told me (01:26:19) because I was his attorney and I could (01:26:21) have gone to the White House and I could (01:26:23) have gotten him a better sentence." And (01:26:25) I said, "Wait a minute. You could have (01:26:28) gone to the White House to say, "Go easy (01:26:30) on Jeffrey Epstein because he's an (01:26:32) Israeli spy collecting information from (01:26:35) American politicians. If I were the (01:26:37) president, I would have hung him from a (01:26:39) tree." (01:26:41) And then Piers Morgan said, "General I (01:26:43) Allen, was he a spy?" And he goes, (01:26:47) [laughter] (01:26:48) "Who knows? (01:26:50) >> Who knows?" (01:26:52) >> It's like, come on, man. Who do you (01:26:54) think is the real adversary of the West? (01:26:58) Because we often talk about it being (01:27:00) Russia or (01:27:00) >> I think it's China. (01:27:02) >> Why? What is it that we don't realize (01:27:04) about China and their agenda? (01:27:06) >> Oh, wow. So much. The Chinese are so (01:27:09) good at what they do. And the Chinese (01:27:12) are so patient. You know, in the United (01:27:15) States, we we don't have long-term (01:27:18) timelines for for anything. When we want (01:27:20) something, we want it now. Is that in (01:27:22) part because we have this four-year (01:27:23) election cycle? (01:27:24) >> Yes, I believe that it is. The Chinese (01:27:27) will plan for something 25 years down (01:27:29) the road (01:27:30) >> because they all still be in power then. (01:27:32) >> Yeah. And so, you know, they're really (01:27:36) good at stealing technology. (01:27:39) There are more Chinese PhD students in (01:27:42) the hard hard sciences here in the (01:27:43) United States than you can shake a stick (01:27:45) at. They're everywhere. They're they're (01:27:47) at every major university and they're (01:27:49) really really smart. (01:27:52) And then often times they'll say, "Oh, (01:27:54) you know, I've had such a great (01:27:55) experience here. I'd like to stay in the (01:27:57) United States." Yeah, I bet you would. I (01:27:59) bet you would. So you can spy for China. (01:28:03) >> Do you think that's happening? (01:28:05) >> Every single day. (01:28:07) >> You think that Chinese students are in (01:28:10) America spying on behalf of China? (01:28:12) >> Yes. (01:28:13) >> Yes. (01:28:14) >> How could you be so sure? (01:28:15) >> I'm 1,000% sure. (01:28:17) >> How could you be so sure? because we (01:28:19) frequently arrest them and then trade (01:28:22) them for Americans who are in Chinese (01:28:24) prisons. (01:28:26) [clears throat] (01:28:27) >> Yeah. (01:28:28) >> And they're masquerading as students. (01:28:32) >> Mhm. PhD candidates always in the hard (01:28:35) sciences. Always. (01:28:37) >> So, China are the long-term adversary. (01:28:40) And what is it that China China want? (01:28:42) What is it they're doing? (01:28:44) >> And what is the outcome? (01:28:45) >> I think they want a couple of things. I (01:28:46) think that (01:28:48) on a more immediate basis they want (01:28:50) reunification with Taiwan. It's going to (01:28:52) happen someday. Even the Taiwanese will (01:28:54) tell you, "Yes, we're a part of China, (01:28:57) but we're kind of not a part of China. (01:28:59) We're not really independent, but we are (01:29:01) kind of independent." (01:29:03) Even American policy is that Taiwan is a (01:29:05) part of China, and eventually someday (01:29:08) they'll be reunited. Do you think with (01:29:11) everything that's going on at the moment (01:29:12) with Trump in Venezuela and Greenland, (01:29:14) this is going to create cover for (01:29:16) >> Oh, I was hoping you would ask me a (01:29:18) question like that. I think that's very (01:29:20) that's a very important issue that that (01:29:24) the media really aren't talking about. (01:29:26) So, (01:29:28) let's put it in the context of what (01:29:30) happened last week in Venezuela because (01:29:33) they're all moving parts of the same of (01:29:36) the same policy. (01:29:38) So, (01:29:41) we we sent a Delta Force squad into (01:29:44) Venezuela a week ago and we snatched (01:29:47) President Maduro and he faces (01:29:49) international narcotics trafficking (01:29:51) charges in New York. Okay. Some people (01:29:53) are for that, some people are against (01:29:55) it. Whether you're for it or against it, (01:29:57) it's happened. There's nothing we can do (01:29:59) about it now. But (01:30:02) that operation may have inadvertently (01:30:06) given the green light to something that (01:30:08) both the Russians and the Chinese have (01:30:09) long sought. The United States really is (01:30:12) the only true superpower in the world. (01:30:15) You know, the Chinese have a lot more (01:30:16) people. They have lots of nuclear (01:30:18) missiles, but they have one aircraft (01:30:21) carrier. We have 12, soon to be 14. We (01:30:24) have way more long-distance bombers. We (01:30:26) have way more fighters. The Russians are (01:30:29) bogged down in a war in in Ukraine. (01:30:31) They're winning the war, but they're (01:30:33) bogged down nonetheless. So, (01:30:37) did this did this reinstitution of the (01:30:39) Monroe Doctrine saying that, you know, (01:30:42) from 1814 that that the Western (01:30:45) Hemisphere is the is the territory of (01:30:49) the United States, it's up to us to (01:30:51) protect it from foreign powers. Well, in (01:30:53) 1814, that meant the British Navy. We (01:30:57) don't really need a Monroe Doctrine and (01:30:58) it's not up to us whether the Argentines (01:31:02) want to have good relations with China (01:31:03) for example. (01:31:06) We invoked the Monroe Doctrine in this (01:31:09) operation to snatch Maduro. So does that (01:31:12) mean then that if we have a sphere of (01:31:15) influence that is the Western Hemisphere (01:31:17) that the Chinese have a sphere of (01:31:19) influence that includes Taiwan that the (01:31:21) Russians have a sphere of influence that (01:31:23) includes Ukraine? because that's kind of (01:31:25) what it seems. It looks like we've given (01:31:27) the green light to both of those (01:31:29) countries and that we're conceding the (01:31:32) fact that it's a unipolar world right (01:31:35) now in favor of a multipolar world. Now, (01:31:39) personally, I think a multipolar world (01:31:41) is safer. (01:31:42) >> What's a multipolar world? (01:31:43) >> Multipolar world is where there's not (01:31:44) just one superpower. There are three or (01:31:47) more. (01:31:50) So in terms of policy, this simple act (01:31:55) of just sending a team in to grab Maduro (01:31:58) has turned international diplomacy on (01:32:00) its head. (01:32:03) What do we do if the Chinese invade (01:32:05) Taiwan? Do we really want to send (01:32:08) American soldiers to, you know, to fight (01:32:10) and die for Taiwan? (01:32:11) >> What do you think would happen if China (01:32:14) tomorrow said, "You know what? We're (01:32:15) going to take Taiwan." (01:32:16) >> You know what? Honest to God, I think (01:32:17) nothing would happen. (01:32:21) I think we would rush to protect (01:32:24) Australia, Japan, South Korea, the (01:32:26) Philippines, Thailand. We'd rush to (01:32:29) protect them. (01:32:30) >> Why? (01:32:31) >> Because they're they're major non-NATO (01:32:33) allies. They're good friends, close (01:32:34) friends. But in terms of going to Taiwan (01:32:37) to fight Chinese soldiers, (01:32:40) I can't imagine it. (01:32:41) >> Trump told the New York Times that (01:32:42) whether China moves on Taiwan is (01:32:44) ultimately up to Chinese President Xi (01:32:47) Jonging. (01:32:48) >> [clears throat] (01:32:48) >> not the USA. Adding that he's told he (01:32:51) would be very unhappy if China changed (01:32:54) the status quo. He claimed he doesn't (01:32:56) think Xi will act while he's president. (01:32:59) >> See, and that is actually what the (01:33:01) long-term policy is. The long-term (01:33:03) policy is sure someday (01:33:07) to be determined later you guys can (01:33:09) unify. (01:33:10) >> Just don't do it while I'm here. (01:33:11) >> Yeah. Don't do it today. (01:33:14) >> Maybe when Trump goes. (01:33:16) >> God forbid. (01:33:18) So going back to this point, you said (01:33:19) they want Taiwan. What else do you think (01:33:21) China want? (01:33:22) >> Well, [sighs and gasps] (01:33:25) do they want to see the US fall? (01:33:27) >> Yes, sure. (01:33:29) >> And are they actively doing things to (01:33:31) encourage that? (01:33:32) >> Yes, but not the things that (01:33:36) that you would expect. (01:33:38) Instead of running around the world, you (01:33:40) know, overthrowing governments, invading (01:33:43) countries, which is what we do, (01:33:48) they go to countries and say, "Hey, you (01:33:50) need a new highway system, we'll pay for (01:33:52) it. You need a new airport, no problem. (01:33:56) You need a new hospital electrical grid, (01:33:58) we have plenty of money from our (01:34:00) gigantic trade surplus. We'll pay for (01:34:02) it. We just want to have really good, (01:34:04) friendly relations with you." And that's (01:34:06) what they do. The Chinese essentially (01:34:09) own Africa right now. (01:34:10) >> What are you most concerned about in the (01:34:12) world at the moment? What what does (01:34:14) actually keep you up at night? What (01:34:16) frightens me the most is that the US (01:34:21) government (01:34:23) over the last (01:34:27) well really over the last (01:34:30) 50 years or 55 years has so inflated its (01:34:35) military budget (01:34:37) that what we spend on the Pentagon is (01:34:41) now more than the next eight largest (01:34:44) countries combined. mind. (01:34:47) Right. [clears throat] (01:34:49) Donald Trump right now spends a a (01:34:51) trillion dollars a year on the Pentagon (01:34:53) budget. He's asking for next year to be (01:34:55) a trillion and a half. (01:34:58) We can't afford it. Our interest on the (01:35:02) national debt is now the third largest (01:35:05) expenditure in government between the (01:35:07) Pentagon and Social Security and then (01:35:09) the the interest on the debt. (01:35:11) >> And why does this bother you? (01:35:12) >> Because we're going bankrupt. And all (01:35:15) the while, the China, the Chinese are (01:35:17) letting us spend ourselves into (01:35:18) oblivion. The Chinese don't spend that (01:35:20) kind of money. How come I can't have a (01:35:23) bullet train that goes 400 miles an (01:35:25) hour? How come I can't get to Chicago in (01:35:27) 3 hours by train? You know, how come the (01:35:31) airports in my country look like [ __ ] (01:35:35) And you go to Chinese airports and (01:35:36) they're pristine with like the most (01:35:39) amazing services and the best (01:35:41) restaurants. How come Chinese roads (01:35:45) don't have potholes? And in my town, (01:35:47) it's like driving across Bosnia. (01:35:51) It's because they decided not to spend (01:35:53) their money on weapons. They spend it on (01:35:56) infrastructure. (01:35:58) >> Do you think that's likely that the US (01:36:00) could go bankrupt effectively? (01:36:02) >> I do. (01:36:04) Yeah, I do. We can't keep up this pace. (01:36:07) It's not possible. We're going to have (01:36:09) to we're going to have to raise taxes (01:36:12) and cut the budget. (01:36:15) >> What's the most important thing that we (01:36:16) didn't talk about that we should have (01:36:17) talked about, John? (01:36:20) >> Oh, that's a good question. (01:36:23) One of the most important things in my (01:36:24) life to tell you the truth, uh, is the (01:36:26) issue of ethics. I love this country (01:36:29) more than anything else in the world, (01:36:31) and I wanted to do the right thing. (01:36:34) We're a country of laws and we have to (01:36:37) obey our laws, which is why I blew the (01:36:40) whistle on the torture program. (01:36:41) >> Who's not obeying the laws? (01:36:43) >> Our government. (01:36:44) >> In what way? (01:36:47) >> We've gotten to the point, and it (01:36:48) started around the year 2000 or 2001. We (01:36:54) got to the point where if we want to do (01:36:56) something, we just do it. (01:36:58) >> Like what? In 1946, (01:37:02) we passed something called the Federal (01:37:04) Torture Act, which banned torture. (01:37:08) Okay. Also in 1946, (01:37:11) we executed (01:37:13) Japanese soldiers who waterboarded (01:37:16) American prisoners of war. That was a (01:37:18) death penalty offense to waterboard (01:37:21) someone. All right. In 1968, on January (01:37:26) the 11th, 1968, (01:37:28) the Washington Post ran a front page (01:37:30) photograph of an American soldier (01:37:33) waterboarding a North Vietnamese (01:37:35) prisoner. When the when the picture ran, (01:37:38) the Secretary of Defense, Robert (01:37:39) McNamera, ordered an immediate (01:37:41) investigation. That soldier was (01:37:43) arrested. He was charged with torture (01:37:47) and he was sentenced to 20 years of hard (01:37:50) labor at Levvenworth. (01:37:53) And then in 2002, (01:37:56) it's legal. We can do it. We can do it (01:37:58) because we're the good guys. (01:38:01) The law never changed. We changed. And (01:38:04) my point was always either we're going (01:38:07) to be the good guys or we're not. Either (01:38:10) we're going to be what Ronald Reagan (01:38:12) called a shining city on a hill or we're (01:38:15) not. It when I was when I was stationed (01:38:17) in Bahrain, I was the human rights (01:38:19) officer. So, I had to write the human (01:38:20) rights report every year that we sent to (01:38:22) Congress. Well, imagine (01:38:25) if John goes in to see the Minister of (01:38:28) Interior. And I say, "Your Highness, you (01:38:32) cannot pick up a 15-year-old kid for (01:38:36) marching in a peaceful pro-democracy (01:38:38) demonstration and then murder him, beat (01:38:41) him to death in the in the police (01:38:43) station, and call his parents to come (01:38:45) and pick up the body." You can't do (01:38:47) that. I have to report that to Congress (01:38:49) and you're going to lose your your (01:38:51) rights to buy American military (01:38:53) hardware. But then the CIA station chief (01:38:56) goes in an hour later and says, "Don't (01:38:59) pay any attention to the human rights (01:39:01) guy. I'll give you $10 million. If you (01:39:05) set up a secret prison here, we're going (01:39:07) to send you some prisoners. You torture (01:39:09) them and then you give us a write up of (01:39:12) everything they say during torture." (01:39:14) Who's he going to listen to? Is he going (01:39:15) to listen to me? (01:39:16) >> Did that happen? Yes. (01:39:21) He's not going to listen to me. (01:39:24) If all of a sudden torture is legal just (01:39:26) cuz we say it is and then Congress is (01:39:28) like, "Oh, we don't know anything (01:39:30) because it's a secret program, so we (01:39:32) can't talk about it." (01:39:33) >> Do we still torture people? (01:39:34) >> No. (01:39:36) I am very proud to say that (01:39:41) when the McCain Feinstein anti-torrture (01:39:43) amendment was passed into law in (01:39:46) December of 2014, John McCain got up on (01:39:49) the floor of the Senate and said it was (01:39:51) because of me, because of my (01:39:53) revelations. He said, "If I had not told (01:39:55) the American people that the CIA was (01:39:58) torturing prisoners in their name, (01:40:01) we would never have known." (01:40:04) That's why I say it was worth it. (01:40:10) >> Do you think you should be pardoned by (01:40:11) by President Trump? (01:40:12) >> I do. (01:40:13) >> Have you written him? (01:40:16) I've [sighs and gasps] (01:40:18) I've (01:40:20) be careful with my language here. I (01:40:25) applied. My name is in the system. I (01:40:28) have very (01:40:31) very high level supporters (01:40:36) who have approached him personally (01:40:39) and I'm hopeful that it happens. (01:40:45) John, we have a closing tradition where (01:40:46) the last guest leaves a question for the (01:40:48) next not knowing who they're going to be (01:40:49) leaving it for. And the question left (01:40:51) for you is, what's something you stopped (01:40:53) doing that improved your life more than (01:40:55) anything you started? (01:41:00) feeling sorry for myself. (01:41:05) I I'll be honest with you. I have (01:41:07) struggled with depression my entire (01:41:09) life. (01:41:11) And after my second divorce, (01:41:15) I went through this period where I was (01:41:17) just I couldn't pull myself out of bed (01:41:20) in the morning because I felt so sorry (01:41:23) for myself. because of the divorce or (01:41:26) because of your life or because (01:41:28) >> the whole thing. I I believed I was just (01:41:30) a loser. I was in my 50s, (01:41:34) unemployable, (01:41:36) convicted felon, barely able to make (01:41:39) ends meet, worried about where my rent (01:41:42) was coming from one month to the next. (01:41:47) And then I thought, "Fuck you. What's (01:41:50) wrong with you? (01:41:52) You don't have to answer to anybody." (01:41:54) And I I told myself no more feeling (01:41:57) sorry for myself. I was going to go make (01:42:00) a career on my own. And so I knew I (01:42:03) would never work for government again. I (01:42:04) knew I would never work in corporate (01:42:06) America again. After I left the CIA, I (01:42:08) was the head of the competitive (01:42:10) intelligence practice at Deote and Touch (01:42:12) spying on Ernstston Young and PWC and (01:42:15) IBM. And it was great fun. I'll never (01:42:18) work in in the corporate world again. So (01:42:20) I decided I'm going to do what I'm good (01:42:22) at. (01:42:24) and I'm a I'm a terrific writer and I'm (01:42:28) told that I'm a gifted storyteller. So, (01:42:30) I'm going to write books. I have two (01:42:33) syndicated newspaper columns that run in (01:42:36) 212 small town papers around the (01:42:39) country. I'm on TV all the time. I have (01:42:42) three podcasts, Drogram, every day on on (01:42:45) both YouTube and Rumble. Thanks for (01:42:47) letting me plug them by the way. (01:42:49) >> Go ahead. (01:42:49) >> Uh Deep Focus on YouTube and on Apple (01:42:52) Podcast. John Kuryaku's Dead Drop, which (01:42:55) is just story after story after story. (01:42:57) And now I make a perfectly great living. (01:43:00) I I'm in a long-term relationship with (01:43:01) the woman I'm crazy about, and life is (01:43:04) good. (01:43:05) >> And it all started with that decision to (01:43:07) stop feeling sorry for yourself. (01:43:08) >> Yes. If people around me keep saying, (01:43:12) "You've done nothing wrong. You're a (01:43:13) hero for what you did." And deep down, I (01:43:16) would do it again, then why am I feeling (01:43:19) sorry for myself? I'm right. They're (01:43:22) wrong. They're criminals. So, I'm just (01:43:25) going to go on with my life. And that (01:43:27) snapped me out of it. (01:43:31) So, don't feel sorry for yourself. (01:43:34) Do something about it. (01:43:37) Act. (01:43:39) >> John, you are someone that is very good (01:43:41) at storytelling. You are. You've written (01:43:42) many books. I'm going to link all the (01:43:43) books below. So many incredible books. (01:43:45) I've got some of them here with me on (01:43:46) the floor. Um, I could go through all of (01:43:49) them, but we need another couple of (01:43:51) days. Um, John, thank you. (01:43:53) >> Thank you. (01:43:54) >> Thank you so much for your incredible (01:43:55) storytelling, your wisdom, but also just (01:43:57) giving us a window into a world that (01:43:59) most of us know nothing about because (01:44:00) there's so many lessons that I think are (01:44:02) pertinent to all of our lives riddled (01:44:03) amongst there. And I think, you know, (01:44:07) I hope you do get pardoned. (01:44:08) >> Thank you. I hope so. I've got my (01:44:11) fingers crossed. (01:44:12) >> And when you do, hopefully we can come (01:44:13) back again and have another (01:44:14) conversation. (01:44:14) >> I look forward to that. It's been such a (01:44:16) pleasure. (01:44:16) >> Pleasure is mine. Thanks for the (01:44:18) invitation. [music] (01:44:22) >> This is something that I've made for (01:44:24) you. I realize that the direio audience (01:44:26) are striv (01:44:29) goals that we want to accomplish. And (01:44:31) one of the things I've learned is that (01:44:33) when you aim at the big big big goal, it (01:44:36) can feel incredibly psychologically (01:44:38) uncomfortable because it's kind of like (01:44:40) being stood at the foot of Mount Everest (01:44:42) and looking upwards. The way to (01:44:43) accomplish your goals is by breaking (01:44:45) them down into tiny small steps. And we (01:44:48) call this in our team the 1%. And (01:44:50) actually this philosophy is highly (01:44:52) responsible for much of our success (01:44:54) here. So what we've done so that you at (01:44:56) home can accomplish any big goal that (01:44:58) you have is we've made these 1% diaries (01:45:01) and we released these last year and they (01:45:03) all sold out. So I asked my team over (01:45:05) and over again to bring the diaries back (01:45:07) but also to introduce some new colors (01:45:08) and to make some minor tweaks to the (01:45:10) diary. So now we have a better range for (01:45:14) you. So if you have a big goal in mind (01:45:16) and you need a framework and a process (01:45:18) and some motivation, then I highly (01:45:21) recommend you get one of these diaries (01:45:22) before they all sell out once again. And (01:45:25) you can get yours now at the diary.com (01:45:27) where you can get 20% off our Black (01:45:29) Friday bundle. And if you want the link, (01:45:30) the link is in the description below. (01:45:33) [music] (01:45:36) Heat. Heat. N. (01:45:42) [music] (01:45:48) >> [singing]